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INTRODUCTION
Social media platforms today are playing an everexpanding role in shaping the contours of today’s information
ecosystem.1 The events of recent months have driven home this
development, as the platforms have shouldered the burden and
attempted to rise to the challenge of ensuring that the public is
informed––and not misinformed––about matters affecting our
democratic institutions in the context of our elections, as well as
about matters affecting our very health and lives in the context
of the pandemic. This Article examines the extensive role social
media companies have recently assumed in combatting
misinformation and disinformation2 in the online marketplace of
ideas, with an emphasis on their efforts to combat medical
misinformation in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic as
well as their efforts to combat false political speech in the 2020
election cycle. In the context of medical misinformation
surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic, this Article analyzes the
extensive measures undertaken by the major social media
platforms to combat such misinformation. In the context of
misinformation in the political sphere, this Article examines the
distinctive problems brought about by the microtargeting of
* William Wallace Kirkpatrick Research Professor and Professor of Law, The
George Washington University Law School. I am extremely grateful to Nathaniel
Christiansen, Chris Frascella, Conor Kelly, Ken Rodriguez, and Jake Warren for
providing excellent research and library assistance in connection with this article, to
Lindsay Byers and Ashley Nicole Fox for excellent editorial work, and to Associate
Dean for Research and Faculty Development Thomas Colby and Dean Dayna
Matthew for academic and financial support of my research.
1
See generally Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018).
2
In this article, I will use the term “misinformation” to refer to false information
regardless of whether the speaker of that information had an “intent to mislead,” and
I use the term “disinformation” to refer to intentionally false information, where the
speaker of that information had an intent to mislead. See, e.g., Valerie Strauss, Word
of the Year: Misinformation. Here’s Why., WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2018/12/10/word-yearmisinformation-heres-why/.
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political speech and by false political ads on social media in
recent years, and the measures undertaken by major social media
companies to address such problems. In both contexts, this
Article examines the extent to which such measures are
compatible with First Amendment substantive and procedural
values.
Social media platforms are essentially attempting to
address today’s serious problems alone, in the absence of federal
or state regulation or guidance in the United States. Despite the
major problems caused by Russian interference in our 2016
elections, the U.S. has failed to enact regulations prohibiting
false or misleading political advertising on social media––
whether originating from foreign sources or domestic ones––
because of First Amendment, legislative, and political
impediments to such regulation. Additionally, the federal
government has failed miserably in its efforts to combat COVID19 or the medical misinformation that has contributed to the
spread of the virus in the U.S. All of this essentially leaves us (in
the United States, at least) solely in the hands, and at the mercy,
of the platforms themselves—to regulate our information
ecosystem (or not), as they see fit.
The dire problems brought about by medical and political
misinformation online in recent months and years have ushered
in a sea change in the platforms’ attitudes and approaches toward
regulating content online. In recent months, for example,
Twitter has evolved from being the non-interventionist “free
speech wing of the free speech party”3 to designing and operating
an immense operation for regulating speech on its platform,
epitomized by its recent removal4 and labeling5 of President
Donald Trump’s (and Donald Trump, Jr.’s) misleading tweets.
Facebook, for its part, has evolved from being a notorious haven

3

See Marvin Ammori, The 'New' New York Times: Free Speech Lawyering in the Age of
Google and Twitter, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2259, 2260 (2014); Josh Halliday, Twitter’s
Tony Wang: ‘We Are the Free Speech Wing of the Free Speech Party,' THE GUARDIAN
(Mar. 22, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/mar/22/twitter-tonywang-free-speech.
4
See Arjun Kharpal, Twitter Removes an Image Tweeted by Trump for Violating Its
Copyright Policy, CNBC (Jul. 2, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/02/twitterremoves-trump-image-in-tweet-for-violating-copyright-policy.html.
5
See Elizabeth Dwoskin, Trump Lashes Out at Social Media Companies After Twitter
Labels Tweets with Fact Checks, WASH. POST (May 27, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/05/27/trump-twitter-label.
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for fake news in the 2016 election cycle6 to setting up an extensive
global network of independent fact-checkers to remove and label
millions of posts on its platform. This has included removing a
post from President Trump’s campaign account.7 In March and
April 2020, Facebook also labeled ninety million posts involving
false or misleading medical information in the context of the
pandemic.8 Google has abandoned its hands-off approach to its
search algorithm results and has committed to removing false
political content in the context of the 2020 election9 and to
serving up prominent information by trusted health authorities
in response to COVID-19 related searches on its platforms.10
These approaches undertaken by the major social media
platforms are generally consistent with First Amendment values,
both the substantive values in terms of what constitutes protected
and unprotected speech, and the procedural values, in terms of
process accorded to users whose speech is restricted or otherwise
subject to action by the platforms. As I discuss below, the
platforms have removed speech that is likely to lead to imminent
harm and have generally been more aggressive in responding to
medical misinformation than political misinformation. This
approach tracks First Amendment substantive values, which
accord lesser protection for false and misleading claims regarding
medical information than for false and misleading political
claims. The platforms’ approaches generally adhere to First
Amendment procedural values as well, including by specifying
precise and narrow categories of what speech is prohibited,
providing clear notice to speakers who violate their rules
regarding speech, applying their rules consistently, and
6

Olivia Solon, 2016: The Year Facebook Became the Bad Guy, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 12,
2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/12/facebook-2016problems-fake-news-censorship.
7
See Heather Kelly, Facebook, Twitter Penalize Trump for Posts Containing Coronavirus
Misinformation, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2020, 2:25 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/08/05/trump-post-removedfacebook/.
8
Guy Rosen, An Update on Our Work to Keep People Informed and Limit Misinformation
About COVID-19, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Apr. 16, 2020),
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/04/COVID-19-misinfo-update [hereinafter
Rosen, COVID-19 Update].
9
Zachary Evans, Google to Place Limits on Political Advertisements Ahead of 2020 Election,
NAT’L REV. (Nov. 21, 2019),
https://www.nationalreview.com/news/google-to-place-limits-on-politicaladvertisements-ahead-of-2020-election.
10
Alexios Mantzarlis, COVID-19: $6.5 Million to Help Fight Coronavirus Misinformation,
GOOGLE (Apr. 2, 2020), https://blog.google/outreach-initiatives/google-newsinitiative/covid-19-65-million-help-fight-coronavirus-misinformation.
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according an opportunity for affected speakers to appeal adverse
decisions regarding their content.
While the major social media platforms’ intervention in
the online marketplace of ideas is not without its problems and
not without its critics, this Article contends that this trend is by
and large a salutary development––one that is welcomed by the
vast majority of Americans and that has brought about
measurable improvements in the online information ecosystem.
Recent surveys and studies show that such efforts are welcomed
by Americans11 and are moderately effective in reducing the
spread of misinformation and in improving the accuracy of
beliefs of members of the public.12 In the absence of effective
regulatory measures in the United States to combat medical and
political misinformation online, social media companies should
be encouraged to continue to experiment with developing and
deploying even more effective measures to combat such
misinformation, consistent with our First Amendment
substantive and procedural values.
This Article begins in Part I with a detailed examination
of how each of the major social media platforms––
Facebook/Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube/Google––address
COVID-19 medical misinformation. Part II conducts a similar
examination with respect to the platforms’ evolving treatment of
political misinformation, an issue made more complicated by the
lack of regulation of political advertising on social media and by
the practice of microtargeting of political ads. Part III assesses
the platforms’ measures to combat medical and political
misinformation through the lens of First Amendment values,
both substantive First Amendment values—the extent to which
the platforms prioritize counterspeech over censorship, absent
emergency—and procedural First Amendment values—the extent
to which the platforms articulate (and communicate to their
users) clear, neutral, and transparent rules, enforced by impartial
decision-makers, with the opportunity for appeal.13 A brief
Conclusion follows.
11

FREE EXPRESSION, HARMFUL SPEECH AND CENSORSHIP IN A DIGITAL WORLD 6
(2020), https://knightfoundation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/KnightFoundation_Panel6-Techlash2_rprt_061220v2_es-1.pdf.
12
Lee Drutman, Fact-Checking Misinformation Can Work. But It Might Not Be Enough,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 4, 2020), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/whytwitters-fact-check-of-trump-might-not-be-enough-to-combat-misinformation.
13
See infra Part III.
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I. PLATFORMS’ EFFORTS TO ADDRESS MEDICAL
MISINFORMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PANDEMIC
In recent months, arguably the most important challenge
for social media platforms has been responding to the rampant
spread of medical misinformation in the context of the COVID19 pandemic. With a significant portion of the global community
under some kind of lockdown order (one third of the global
population by one estimate14), Internet connectivity––along with
Internet content––are playing a more significant societal role
than ever. In contrast to their previous hands-off position, the
major platforms have risen to the challenge and have taken
decisive action in response to medical misinformation in the
context of the pandemic. The predominant focus across
platforms has been on the curbing of false information, especially
that which tends to encourage the spread of imminently harmful
information about the virus. The platforms’ actions taken in
response to COVID-19-related medical misinformation have
generally been more aggressive than their response to
misinformation in the political arena, which is consistent with
First Amendment substantive values that accord lesser
protection for false and misleading statements of fact than for
false and misleading political claims (as I discuss below). And
the platforms’ actions in the context of medical misinformation
generally track First Amendment substantive values by
prohibiting false and imminently harmful information. In
general, the platforms have undertaken extensive measures to
remove imminently harmful false medical information (e.g.,
posts that advocate drinking bleach to cure COVID-19), while
taking less severe measures regarding less harmful or misleading
medical information (e.g., posts that tout conspiracy theories
claiming that Dr. Anthony Fauci created the virus), such as by
labeling or reducing the reach of such posts. Although the
platforms’ efforts thus far are commendable, they must act much
more quickly to remove harmful false and misleading medical
misinformation before it goes viral, as I discuss below.

14

Juliana Kaplan, Lauren Frias & Morgan McFall-Johnsen, A Third of the Global
Population is on Coronavirus Lockdown—Here’s Our Constantly Updated List of Countries
and Restrictions, BUS. INSIDER INDIA (Jul. 11, 2020),
https://www.businessinsider.in/international/news/a-third-of-the-globalpopulation-is-on-coronavirus-lockdown-x2014-hereaposs-our-constantly-updated-listof-countries-and-restrictions/slidelist/75208623.cms.
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A. Facebook’s Response to Medical Misinformation
Facebook has responded to the rampant spread of
misinformation on its platform in the context of the pandemic by
removing speech that it considers to be imminently harmful,
while providing counterspeech in response to misleading or false
speech on its platform that it deems not to be imminently
harmful. Pursuant to this approach, as discussed below,
Facebook has removed millions of harmful false or misleading
posts related to COVID-19—including, recently, posts by
President Trump, while labeling other, less harmful false or
misleading posts and issuing strong warnings to those who have
shared or reacted to such posts.15 In addition, Facebook has also
made prominently available its Coronavirus Information Center,
a repository of curated, expert information about the virus.16
Facebook’s intent to combat medical misinformation in the
context of the pandemic is commendable, but the failures in the
timely implementation of its new policies are highly problematic
given the degree of the public health risk. While Facebook
cannot reasonably be expected to identify and curb every piece
of misinformation on the pandemic on its platform, it must
commit to staffing up and improving the implementation of its
measures to counter medical misinformation. Facebook’s
success rate in curbing harmful misinformation might never be
perfect, but its present approach has glaring flaws that must be
remedied, as I examine below.
In a surprising move in August 2020, Facebook
implemented its COVID-19 misinformation policy to delete a
post from President Trump’s campaign account, in which Trump
can be heard saying on video, in the context of re-opening
schools, that children are “almost immune” to the coronavirus.17
While Facebook does not frequently remove medical
misinformation, its Community Standards allow for removal of
misinformation that contributes to the risk of physical harm or

15

See infra notes 17–29 and accompanying text.
Kang-Xing Jin, Launching the Coronavirus Information Center on Facebook, March 18,
2020, 11:06 AM update to Keeping People Safe and Informed About the Coronavirus,
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM,
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/08/coronavirus/#coronavirus-info-center (last
updated Oct. 5, 2020).
17
Kelly, supra note 7.
16
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imminent violence.18 In response to guidance from external
experts, including the World Health Organization (WHO) and
local health authorities, Facebook now requires the removal of
“false claims about: the existence or severity of COVID-19, how
to prevent COVID-19, how COVID-19 is transmitted (such as
false claims that certain racial groups are immune to the virus),
cures for COVID-19, and access to or the availability of essential
services.”19
Facebook has broadened its work with certified
independent fact-checking organizations20 as part of its effort to
curb the spread of medical misinformation, adding eight new
dedicated fact-checking partners and “expand[ing] [its] coverage
to more than a dozen new countries.”21 Facebook’s approach to
medical misinformation generally focuses less on removing false
content and more on reducing the distribution of medical
misinformation once one of its independent fact-checking
partners has rated it as false.22 To the everyday user, Facebook’s
approach takes the form of warning displays on posts that have
been deemed false, with Facebook issuing forty million such
warnings in March 2020 and fifty million in April 2020.23
Facebook claims that when people see such warning labels,
“95% of the time they did not go on to view the original
content.”24 In addition, in response to the pandemic, Facebook
has “updated its content reviewer guidance to make clear that
claims such as that people of certain races or religions have the

18

LAURA W. MURPHY ET AL., FACEBOOK’S CIVIL RIGHTS AUDIT – FINAL REPORT 53
(2020), https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Civil-Rights-AuditFinal-Report.pdf.
19
Id.
20
"To reduce the spread of misinformation and provide more reliable information to
users, we partner with independent third-party fact-checkers globally who are
certified through the non-partisan International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN)."
Partnering with Third-Party Fact-Checkers, FACEBOOK: JOURNALISM PROJECT (Mar. 23,
2020), https://www.facebook.com/journalismproject/programs/third-party-factchecking/selecting-partners. For a list of verified signatories, see Verified Signatories of
the IFCN Code of Principles, https://ifcncodeofprinciples.poynter.org/signatories (last
accessed Sept. 3, 2020).
21
Rosen, COVID-19 Update, supra note 8. Facebook has also expanded the program
to Instagram and now boasts “more than 60 fact-checking partners covering more
than 50 languages around the world." Guy Rosen, Investments to Fight Polarization,
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (May 27, 2020),
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/05/investments-to-fight-polarization.
22
Rosen, COVID-19 Update, supra note 8.
23
Id.
24
Id.
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virus, created the virus, or are spreading the virus violate
Facebook’s hate speech policies.”25
As part of its general counterspeech approach of
presenting users with accurate information in response to false
and misleading information, as opposed to by censoring false
information, Facebook has also taken the step of reaching out to
users who have interacted with (i.e., reacted to or commented
on) medical misinformation related to COVID-19 and
connecting those users with responses to common “myths”
about COVID-19 that have been identified and addressed by the
World Health Organization and inviting these users to share the
link with others.26 See notice below.

Figure One: Notice on Facebook directing users who have
interacted with COVID-19 misinformation to the WHO.27
The most common of the myths shared on Facebook tend
to suggest ineffective or potentially harmful remedies for
COVID-19, such as drinking bleach or disinfectant, or taking
unproven and potentially harmful drugs such as

25

MURPHY ET AL., FACEBOOK’S CIVIL RIGHTS AUDIT – FINAL REPORT, supra note 18
at 53.
26
Rosen, COVID-19 Update, supra note 8.
27
For Facebook’s explanation of this notification, see Rosen, supra note 8.
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hydroxychloroquine.28 Other myths commonly seen on the
platform are those claiming that measures scientifically proven
to contain the spread of the virus—such as social distancing—
are ineffective.29
In attempting to combat medical misinformation in the
context of the pandemic, Facebook has also set up its
Coronavirus Information Center.30 This feature, which
Facebook initially placed prominently at the top of the News
Feed (so that it was immediately visible upon opening the
platform) serves as a collection of relevant real-time updates
about the pandemic from both national and global health
authorities.31
Facebook’s
approach
to
combating
medical
misinformation on its platform32 is heading in the right direction
28

Coronavirus Disease Advice for the Public: Mythbusters, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/advice-forpublic/myth-busters (last accessed July 21, 2020).
29
Some recent research has highlighted the parallels in the sharing of disinformation
in the current pandemic with the dissemination of information on supposed “cures”
via newspapers during the 1918 flu pandemic. Suyin Haynes, ‘You Must Wash
Properly.’ Newspaper Ads From the 1918 Flu Pandemic Show Some Things Never Change,
TIME (Mar. 27, 2020, 11:35 AM), https://time.com/5810695/spanish-flu-pandemiccoronavirus-ads/. As Elizabeth Zetland, a researcher at MyHeritage, puts it, “You
were meant to cook 12 onions, get the juice and drink it the day afterwards, and that
would protect you from the flu.” Id. Newspapers were quick to urge individuals to
wear or make their own masks; the Red Cross, in an ad placed in the Daily Gazette of
Berkeley, California, called anyone not wearing a mask “a dangerous slacker.” Id.
30
See Kang-Xing Jin, Keeping People Safe and Informed About the Coronavirus,
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, https://about.fb.com/news/2020/08/coronavirus (last
updated Oct. 5, 2020).
31
Jin, supra note 16.
32
Facebook’s approach to combating medical misinformation also encompasses its
response to protests involving stay-at-home measures that authorities have deemed
necessary to curb the spread of the pandemic. Donnie O’Sullivan & Brian Fung,
Facebook Will Take Down Some, But Not All, Posts Promoting Anti-Stay-at-Home Protests,
CNN POLITICS (Apr. 20, 2020, 1:54 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/20/politics/facebook-COVID-shutdownprotests/index.html. Thus far, the company’s response to such protests has been
inconsistent. See id. Facebook has removed posts organizing anti-stay-at-home
protests in California, New Jersey, and Nebraska after determining—in consultation
with state officials—that the protests violated the states’ social distancing rules. Id.
In Pennsylvania, however, an anti-lockdown group with more than 66,000 members
promoted a lockdown protest scheduled to take place in Harrisburg, without any
action from Facebook. Id. Facebook’s efforts in this area are sporadic and appear to
lack a coherent strategy. In New Jersey, for example, state officials had not
specifically requested that Facebook take down content promoting anti-lockdown
events, but Facebook staff had been “communicating about the issue” with the
governor’s staff. Id. In Nebraska, Facebook contacted the governor’s office “to learn
more about Nebraska’s social distancing restrictions, and the governor’s staff

42
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but is plagued by unacceptable delays. A comprehensive study
undertaken by the human rights group Avaaz examined the
dissemination of “over 100 pieces of misinformation . . . about
the virus that were rated false and/or misleading by reputable,
independent fact-checkers and that could cause public harm.”33
Avaaz’s review found that “millions of the platform’s users are
still being put at risk,” and that “the pieces of [false and/or
misleading] content [sampled by Avaaz] . . . were shared over
1.7 million times on Facebook, and viewed an estimated 117
million times.”34 For example, according to Avaaz, “a harmful
misinformation post that claimed that one way to rid the body of
the virus is to . . . gargle with water, salt or vinegar was shared
over [31,000] times before eventually being taken down after
Avaaz flagged [this content for action by] Facebook.”35
Beyond failing to apply warning labels to content that its
fact-checking partners deemed to be misleading, Facebook
suffers from delays in the implementation of its policies. In this
age of instant digital news, unless imminently harmful medical
disinformation is rapidly curbed, it runs the risk of hastening the
spread of the virus.36 And yet according to Avaaz, “it can take up
to 22 days for the platform to downgrade [false and/or
misleading content related to the virus] and issue warning
labels.”37 The lag is even more severe in the case of non-English
content, where “[o]ver half (51%) of non-English misinformation
content had no warning labels.”38 Fortunately, Facebook seems
provided publicly available information about Nebraska’s 10-person limit and
directed health measures.” Id. Facebook is apparently reaching out to governments
on these matters because “[u]nless government prohibits the event during this time,
we allow it to be organized on Facebook.” Id. Yet, at least in the case of Nebraska,
Facebook’s effort seems to be a somewhat fumbling one, with Facebook employees
reaching out to state officials to learn about information that is already readily
available. See id. Facebook’s hesitance to remove posts related to protests likely stems
from a deeper worry about becoming the online policeman on the question of the
constitutional right to assemble.
33
How Facebook Can Flatten the Curve of the Coronavirus Infodemic, AVAAZ at 2 (Apr. 15,
2020), https://avaazimages.avaaz.org/facebook_coronavirus_misinformation.pdf
[hereinafter How Facebook Can Flatten the Curve].
34
Id.
35
Id. at 10 (“2,611 clones [of the same false post] remain on the platform with over
92,246 interactions. Most of these cloned posts have no warning labels from
Facebook.”).
36
See Robyn Caplan, COVID-19 Misinformation Is a Crisis of Content Mediation,
BROOKINGS: TECHSTREAM (May 7, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/covid-19-misinformation-is-a-crisis-ofcontent-mediation.
37
How Facebook Can Flatten the Curve, supra note 33, at 2.
38
Id. at 3.
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willing to change course, as evidenced by its willingness to
institute a retroactive alert system, whereby each user exposed to
harmful misinformation will be notified and provided with
accurate information.39 Avaaz indicated that members of
Facebook’s misinformation team made such a commitment in a
conversation with Avaaz staff in April 2020.40

B. Twitter’s Response to Medical Misinformation
Twitter’s response to medical misinformation in the
context of the pandemic––like its response to false political ads,
as discussed below––has been more forceful than Facebook’s
approach. Twitter’s response includes removing harmful posts
containing medical misinformation that “could directly pose a
risk to people’s health or well-being,” counterspeech through
labelling other posts containing medical misinformation, and
also directing users to truthful and accurate information about
the pandemic.41 Twitter has also limited the functionality of user
accounts that violate its policies.42
Under a recent update to Twitter’s rules, tweets that cause
harm, including in the context of the pandemic, will be
removed.43 Accordingly, Twitter will remove from its platform
tweets along the lines of “social distancing is not effective” or
“the news about washing your hands is propaganda.”44 An
important component of Twitter’s effort includes broadening its
definition of harmful tweets, so as to more proactively target and
remove content that expressly contradicts the most up-to-date
guidance from authoritative health sources such as the Center for
Disease Control and the World Health Organization.45
39

Id. at 2.
See id. at 19 n. 5.
41
Coronavirus: Staying Safe and Informed on Twitter, TWITTER BLOG (Apr. 3, 2020),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/covid-19.html.
42
See Twitter Comms (@TwitterComms), TWITTER (July 28, 2020, 10:15 AM),
https://twitter.com/TwitterComms/status/1288115957005578246.
43
Coronavirus: Staying Safe and Informed on Twitter, supra note 41.
44
Jack Morse, Twitter Steps up Enforcement in the Face of Coronavirus Misinformation,
MASHABLE (Mar. 18, 2020), https://mashable.com/article/twitter-cracks-downcoronavirus-misinformation/.
45
Vijaya Gadde & Matt Derella, An Update on Our Continuity Strategy During COVID19, TWITTER BLOG (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/An-update-on-ourcontinuity-strategy-during-COVID-19.html. For a full list of Twitter’s pandemicrelated misinformation policies, see id.
40

44
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Twitter states that it is working with “trusted partners,
including public health authorities . . . and governments” to both
identify and remove harmful medical misinformation.46 Twitter
states it will remove a broad range of content. Twitter is focused
on tweets that contain a “denial of global or local health
authority recommendations . . . with the intent to influence
people into acting against recommended guidance,” those that
“[describe] alleged cures for COVID-19, which are not
immediately harmful but are known to be ineffective . . . ,” those
that describe “harmful treatments or protection measures which
are known to be ineffective . . . ,” and those that deny
“established scientific facts about transmission during the
incubation period.”47
Twitter is also targeting tweets that go beyond medical
misinformation and appear to encourage societal unrest. For
example, the company states that it will target and remove tweets
that contain “[s]pecific and unverified claims that incite people
to action and cause widespread panic, social unrest or large-scale
social disorder,” as well as tweets that contain “[s]pecific and
unverified claims made by people impersonating a government
or health official or organization.”48 One such example was a
“parody account of an Italian health official stating that the
country’s quarantine was over.”49
In May 2020, Twitter announced a policy of placing
warning labels on tweets containing misinformation related to
COVID-19, including tweets that are issued by world leaders.50
According to Twitter’s head of site integrity, Yoel Roth, such
warning labels will apply to “anyone sharing misleading
information that meets the requirements of Twitter’s policy, and
no exceptions will be made for the tweets of world leaders.”51
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Pursuant to its policy of removing COVID-19 related
medical misinformation, including from world leaders, in
August 2020 Twitter required the Trump campaign to remove a
tweet in which Trump claimed that children are “almost
immune” to the virus.52 Twitter suspended the account’s
tweeting privileges until the post was deleted, citing its rules on
COVID-19.53
In addition to removing and labeling tweets in its
attempts to restrict false and misleading medical information in
the context of the pandemic, Twitter is also pursuing other
means, including restricting the functionality of Twitter accounts
that spread such information. For example, on July 28, Twitter
penalized Donald Trump, Jr., for posting misinformation in the
form of a Breitbart video showing a group of doctors making
misleading and false claims about the COVID-19 pandemic.54 In
the video, a group of people dressed in white lab coats, who call
themselves “America’s Frontline Doctors,” staged a press
conference in front of the U.S. Supreme Court and claimed that
hydroxychloroquine is “a cure for Covid” and people “don’t
need a mask to slow the spread of coronavirus.”55 Twitter
ordered Trump Jr. to delete this misleading tweet, added a note
to its trending topics warning about the potential dangers of
hydroxychloroquine, and took measures to limit Trump Jr.’s
account functionality for twelve hours.56 Facebook and YouTube
also removed the offending video, but not before it had been
viewed millions of times.57

52

Shannon Bond, Twitter, Facebook Remove Trump Post Over False Claim About Children
And COVID-19, NPR (Aug. 5, 2020, 8:49 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/08/05/899558311/facebook-removes-trump-post-overfalse-claim-about-children-and-covid-19.
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Roth, supra note 51.
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See Rachel Lerman, Katie Shepherd & Taylor Telford, Twitter Penalizes Donald
Trump Jr. for Posting Hydroxychloroquine Misinformation Amid Coronavirus Pandemic,
WASH. POST (July 28, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/07/28/trump-coronavirusmisinformation-twitter/.
55
See Sam Shead, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube Pull ‘False’ Coronavirus Video After It
Goes Viral, CNBC (July 28, 2020, 7:37 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/28/facebook-twitter-youtube-pull-falsecoronavirus-video-after-it-goes-viral.html.
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See Lerman, Shepherd & Telford, supra note 54.
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See Shead, supra note 55.
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Figure Two: Twitter’s explanation of limiting the functionality
of Donald Trump Jr.’s account in July 2020.58
In addition to implementing systems to remove false and
misleading medical information, Twitter is also prominently
featuring truthful and accurate information about COVID-19
through its “Know The [F]acts” search prompt.59 In early 2020,
Twitter expanded its #KnowTheFacts program, which it had
earlier put in place to help the public find credible information

58

Twitter Comms (@TwitterComms), TWITTER (July 28, 2020, 10:15 AM),
https://twitter.com/TwitterComms/status/1288115957005578246.
59
Coronavirus: Staying Safe and Informed on Twitter, supra note 41.
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on immunization and vaccine health.60 The purpose of this
program was to surface and “highlight credible information” on
the virus.61 The program also ensured that when Twitter users
access the platform to search for information about the virus,
they are first met with “credible, authoritative information” from
reliable sources.62 A further component of Twitter’s
#KnowTheFacts program limits auto-suggest results that may
direct Twitter users to misinformation on Twitter.63 And, similar
to Facebook, Twitter has created a specific webpage dedicated to
providing the latest authoritative information on the pandemic.64
This resource—Twitter’s “COVID-19 Event Page”—provides
an aggregation of credible news updates on the pandemic,
curated with content from verified sources like The New York
Times, Associated Press, and Reuters, as well as public health
sources such as the Center for Disease Control (CDC), which
provide relevant virus-related updates.65
Twitter’s aggressive approach to medical misinformation
on its platform appears to be extensive and effective, so far.
According to Twitter’s reporting on the implementation of its
policies regarding medical misinformation in the context of the
pandemic, it has removed thousands of tweets containing
misleading and potentially harmful content and has “challenged
more than 1.5 million accounts which were targeting discussions
around COVID-19 with spammy or manipulative behaviors.”66

C. Google/YouTube’s Response to Medical Misinformation
Google’s approach to searches that seek information on
COVID-19 is similarly proactive. Consistent with First
Amendment values, Google/YouTube has avoided censorship
of medical misinformation by employing counterspeech in the
form of directing users to authoritative sources when they search
for terms likely to produce search results containing
60
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Times, Associated Press, and Reuters, as well as public health sources such as the CDC
and similar international entities. See id.
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misinformation. Google/YouTube also removed one major
incentive to post such content in the first place by demonetizing
videos that violate its policies, in lieu of censoring the content
outright.
Google has, for most of its history, deferred solely to its
complex algorithms to produce search results without human
intervention. However, the company now has taken the
approach of having searches related to coronavirus trigger a type
of “SOS alert,” resulting in prominent displays of news from
“mainstream publications including National Public Radio,
followed by information from the U.S. CDC and the WHO.”67

67

Mark Bergen & Garrit De Vynck, Google Scrubs Coronavirus Misinformation on
Search, YouTube, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 10, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-10/dr-google-scrubscoronavirus-misinformation-on-search-youtube.
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Figure Three: Google search results page in response to
searching for “coronavirus cure,” as of July 6, 2020.68
In addition, YouTube has modified its Terms of Service
to prohibit any content that directly contradicts advice from the
68

See, e.g., Coronavirus Cure, GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=coronavirus+cure (last
accessed Jan. 12, 2021) (displaying an informational banner linking to the CDC in
response to the search “coronavirus cure”).
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WHO.69 In an update to its monetization policy, YouTube
announced that it will prohibit videos that seek to capitalize on
coronavirus-related conspiracies.70 Instead, it has directed users
to videos debunking the conspiracies.71

Figure Four: YouTube search results page in response to
searching for “coronavirus bleach,” as of July 6, 2020.72
YouTube, however, like Facebook, has run into
difficulties countering medical misinformation on its platform,
especially in regions where fact-checking is not as readily
achievable or practical as it is in the United States.73 This is partly
69

Coronavirus: YouTube Bans ‘Medically Unsubstantiated’ Content, BBC NEWS (Apr. 22,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52388586.
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Monetization update on COVID-19 content, YOUTUBE HELP,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/9803260?hl=en (last accessed Oct. 16,
2020).
71
Health information panels, YOUTUBE HELP,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/9795167 (last accessed Oct. 16, 2020).
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See, e.g., Coronavirus Bleach, YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=coronavirus+bleach (last visited
Jan. 12, 2021) (displaying a warning banner and linking to the CDC in response to a
search for “coronavirus bleach”).
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Ryan Browne, YouTube Expands Fact-checking Feature for Video Searches to Europe,
CNBC (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/24/youtube-expands-factchecking-feature-for-video-searches-to-europe.html.
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a result of the nature of the medium itself. YouTube videos
typically involve creative elements such that the question of
whether the content is true or false becomes more complex.
YouTube has recently adopted the same approach as Google,
providing a banner at the top of searches for terms such as
“coronavirus” or “coronavirus cure” with a link to the CDC’s
official page (see below).74

Figure Five: YouTube search results page in response to
searching for “coronavirus,” as of July 6, 2020.75

Figure Six: YouTube search results page in response to
searching for “coronavirus cure,” as of July 6, 2020.76
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See, e.g., Coronavirus, YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=Coronavirus (last visited Jan. 12,
2021) (displaying a warning banner and linking to the CDC in response to a search
for “coronavirus”).
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See, e.g., Coronavirus Cure, YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=coronavirus+cure (last visited Jan.
12, 2021) (displaying a warning banner and linking to the CDC in response to a
search for “coronavirus cure”).
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II. PLATFORMS’ EFFORTS TO ADDRESS POLITICAL
MISINFORMATION: MEASURES TO COMBAT FALSE AND
MISLEADING POLITICAL SPEECH AND MICROTARGETING OF
POLITICAL ADS
A. Introduction
While
the
severe
consequences
of medical
misinformation in the pandemic context are patently clear—
more people will be more likely to contract the disease and/or
suffer related medical harms—the consequences of political
misinformation were evidenced in the aftermath of the United
States’ 2016 presidential election—namely, the targeted
suppression of certain demographics of voters77 and rampant
disinformation injected into the public discourse by foreign
operatives.78 The presence of political misinformation on social
media introduces two new complications: the host of regulations
that apply to traditional broadcasting of political advertisements
do not apply to social media platforms,79 and the microtargeting80
of political advertisements threatens the broad exposure and
public scrutiny that are necessary for the marketplace of ideas81
to function.
Today’s online information ecosystem continues to be a
forum for political and election-related misinformation, as it was
four years ago in the context of the 2016 election.
Misinformation and disinformation on the Internet are
particularly problematic given that the Internet is a dominant (if
not the dominant) source of information in the political sphere,
with two-thirds of Americans identifying Internet sources as their
leading sources of information in connection with the 2016 U.S.
presidential election.82 In addition, misinformation can spread
77

Spencer Overton, State Power to Regulate Social Media Companies to Prevent Voter
Suppression, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1793, 1795–98 (2020).
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Hearing on Social Media Influence in the 2016 United States Elections, Before the Senate
Select Comm. on Intel., U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. INTEL. (2017)
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-social-media-influence2016-us-elections#.
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See infra Part II.C.
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See infra Part II.E.
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See generally Dawn C. Nunziato, The Marketplace of Ideas Online, 94 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1519 (2019) [hereinafter Nunziato, The Marketplace of Ideas Online].
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See Honest Ads Act, S. 1989, 115th Cong. § 3(10) (2017); ELECTION 2016:
CAMPAIGNS AS A DIRECT SOURCE OF NEWS 28 (2016)
https://www.journalism.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/8/2016/07/PJ_2016.07.18_election-2016_FINAL.pdf.
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faster and farther than truthful information on social media.83
According to a recent study published in Science, false news—and
in particular, false political news—“spreads more quickly than
the truth” with the top 1% of false news cascades diffused to
between 1,000 and 100,000 people (whereas the truth rarely
diffused to more than 1,000 people) and with false news diffusing
faster than the truth.84 The authors of the study in Science
investigated the “differential diffusion of all of the verified true
and false news stories distributed on Twitter from 2006 to 2017 .
. . [this included approximately] 126,000 stories tweeted by
approximately 3 million people more than 4.5 million times.”85
They observed that "[f]alsehood diffused significantly farther,
faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all categories
of information, and the effects were more pronounced for false
political news” than for false news concerning other subjects,
such as “natural disasters, science, urban legends, or financial
information.”86
False and misleading political content on social media
platforms––especially on Facebook—played a significant role in
influencing members of the electorate leading up to the 2016
election. “More than one quarter of voting-age adults visited a
false news website . . . in the final weeks of the 2016 campaign.”87
83

See Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, & Sinan Aral, The Spread of True and False News
Online, 359 SCIENCE 1146, 1146–1151 (2018).
84
Id. at 1148.
85
The authors of the study in Science classified news as “true” or “false” using
information from six independent fact-checking organizations that exhibited ninetyfive percent to ninety-eight percent agreement on the classifications. Id. at 1146.
86
Id. Interestingly, the authors further observe that “[c]ontrary to conventional
wisdom, robots accelerated the spread of true and false news at the same rate,
implying that false news spreads more than the truth because humans, not robots, are
more likely to spread it.” Id. But that is not to diminish the role that bots played in
Russian interference in the 2016 election. Foreign interference in our 2016
presidential elections was clearly exacerbated by the use of automation in the form of
bots, trolls, and fake accounts and by the use of microtargeted political
advertisements to amplify disinformation, manipulate public discourse, exacerbate
political and social divisions, and deceive voters on a mass scale, especially via
Twitter’s platform, in a manner that was targeted to members of the U.S. electorate,
especially in swing states. Natasha Bertrand, Twitter Users Spreading Fake News
Targeted Swing States in the Run-Up to Election Day, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 28, 2017, 1:17
PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/fake-news-and-propaganda-targeted-swingstates-before-election-2017-9. Trump won the Electoral College because some eighty
thousand votes went his way in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. See e.g.,
KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, CYBERWAR: HOW RUSSIAN HACKERS AND TROLLS
HELPED ELECT A PRESIDENT 67 (2018).
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Indeed, “[i]n the months leading up to the election, the top 20
fake news stories had more “engagements” (which includes
shares, reactions, and comments) than the top twenty hard news
stories––approximately nine million engagements with fake
news as compared to about seven million engagements with hard
news stories.88 According to Buzzfeed, “[i]n the final three
months of the U.S. presidential campaign, the top-performing
fake election stories on Facebook generated more engagement
than the top news stories from major news outlets like The New
York Times, The Washington Post, Huffington Post, and NBC
News.”89

B. Political Speech and Political Advertising on Social Media
Platforms Today
Political advertising on social media platforms is big
business—and, as of this writing—still largely unregulated
business in the United States. The total amount spent on digital
political advertising in the U.S. is expected to reach $2.9 billion
in 2020 (an increase of over 100% from 2016), with Google and
Facebook capturing the vast majority of digital political
advertising.90 Because of the power of such ads in influencing our
democratic processes, the use of microtargeting to target specific,
narrow segments of the electorate, and the substance of such
ads—including false and misleading information—have been
subject to intense scrutiny, as discussed below.
Because political advertising has the potential to affect
our democratic processes in powerful ways, it has traditionally
been subject to a host of government regulations, including
transparency regulations, disclosure regulations, public file
regulations, and prohibitions on foreign participation.91 Yet, as
of this writing, such government regulations only apply to
traditional media.92 Despite the fact that digital advertising has
88
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surpassed advertising in print and television, government
regulations on political advertising generally do not apply to
online mediums.93 Although the federal Honest Ads Act was
introduced as an attempt to remedy this regulatory gap and to
extend this host of regulations on political advertising to social
media platforms, as of this writing, the Act has not been enacted
into law.94 In addition, Maryland’s attempts to regulate political
advertising online have been subject to successful First
Amendment challenges, as discussed below.95 Accordingly, the
social media giants—Facebook, Twitter, and Google—have
been left to their own devices to determine whether and how to
regulate political advertising and the microtargeting of political
ads on their platforms.
Below, in Part C, I briefly survey the current state of the
regulation of political advertising applicable to traditional
mediums of expression. In Part D, I examine the proposed
federal Honest Ads Act. In Part E, I turn to the special problems
of microtargeting of political advertising on social media. I then
analyze the steps that the major social media platforms have
taken—and have declined to take—to address the problems
caused by false political speech on their forums and by the
microtargeting of political ads in particular.

C. Federal Regulation of Political Advertising Applicable to
Traditional Media
Various federal statutes, Federal Election Commission
(FEC) rules, and Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
rules currently impose transparency requirements on political
advertisements disseminated by broadcast, cable, and satellite
providers, and also prohibit these providers from accepting
foreign advertisements in U.S. elections. First, FEC regulations
93
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VOX MEDIA (Feb. 20, 2019, 9:02 AM),
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https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1989/actions (last
accessed Jan. 12, 2021).
95
In December 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that two
of Maryland’s regulations for political advertising online violated the First
Amendment as applied to a group of media plaintiffs, including The Washington Post
and The Baltimore Sun, among others. Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 520
(4th Cir. 2019).
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impose transparency requirements on political advertisements
disseminated via non-social media: “any public communication
made by a political committee––including communications that
do not expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified federal candidate or solicit a contribution––must
display a disclaimer.”96 Additionally, “[d]isclaimers must also
appear on political committees' internet websites and in certain
email communications.”97 All electioneering communications,
public communications that expressly advocate the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate,
and public
communications that solicit a contribution require a disclaimer,
regardless of who has paid for them.98 Furthermore “[p]ublic
communications include electioneering communications and
any other form of general public political advertisement,
including communications made using the following media:
broadcast, cable or satellite; newspaper or magazine; outdoor
advertising facility; mass mailing (more than 500 substantially
similar mailings within 30 days); phone bank (more than 500
substantially similar calls within 30 days); [and] communications
placed for a fee on another person’s website.”99
Second, the “Foreign Participation Ban” prohibits
foreign nationals from attempting to influence elections through
donations, expenditures, or other things of value.100 Existing
regulations applicable to broadcast, cable, and satellite platforms
include a broad prohibition on the involvement of foreign
nationals with elections in the United States.101 Foreign nationals
are prohibited from making any contribution, donation, or
expenditure in connection with any federal, state, or local
election; making any contribution or donation to any committee
or organization of any national, state, or local political party; or
making
any
disbursement
for
an
electioneering
communication.102
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Third, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA),
which applies to traditional media, imposes disclosure and
public file requirements aimed at informing the electorate about
the source of election related advertisements; these provisions
have been upheld by the Supreme Court.103 BCRA § 311 requires
that televised “electioneering communications” funded by
anyone other than a candidate include a statement clearly
indicating who was responsible for the ad, along with the name
and address (or web address) of the person who funded the
ad.104 In addition, BCRA requires that anyone who spent more
than $10,000 on electioneering communications within a
calendar year file a detailed statement with the FEC, providing
their name, the amount of the expenditure, and the name of the
election to which the communication was directed, among other
details.105 In upholding BCRA’s disclosure and public file
requirements against a First Amendment challenge by Citizens
United, the Supreme Court explained that these provisions
“provid[e] the electorate with information” and “insure that
voters are fully informed about the person or group who is
speaking . . . so that people will be able to evaluate the arguments
to which they are being subjected.”106 The Court concluded that
these requirements were a less restrictive alternative compared to
other, more extensive regulations of political speech, since “the
public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a
candidate shortly before an election,” and that this
“informational interest alone is sufficient to justify application of
[the Act] to these ads.”107
None of the above regulations currently apply to political
advertising on social media.

D. The Proposed Honest Ads Act
As discussed above, various federal statutes and Federal
Election Commission rules currently impose transparency
requirements on political advertisements disseminated by
103

See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107–155, 116
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(2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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broadcast, cable, and satellite providers, and also impose
requirements on these providers prohibiting foreign participation
in U.S. elections.108 Social media platforms like Google,
Facebook, and Twitter are currently not subject to the federal
statutes and FEC rules109 discussed above.
The Honest Ads Act, introduced in October 2017 by
Senators Mark Warner (D–Virginia), Amy Klobuchar (D–
Minnesota), and the late John McCain (R–Arizona), seeks to
remedy this regulatory disparity.110 It imposes transparency
regulations on online political advertisements and requires that
online platforms enforce the longstanding ban on foreign
participation in United States elections.111
Although, as
discussed infra, social media platforms like Twitter, Google, and
Facebook are undertaking substantial measures themselves to
address such problems,112 these measures may be revisited or
revoked by the platforms at any time. Therefore, government
regulation in the form of the Honest Ads Act is still an important
tool for addressing these problems, and, indeed, one that is
welcomed by the platforms.113

E. The Special Problems Caused by Microtargeting of Political Ads
Microtargeting of ads on social media platforms is a
practice that generally allows advertisers to limit their messaging
to narrow subsets of individuals by exploiting the vast trove of
social data about individuals’ online behavior and preferences
that has been collected by social media platforms.114
Microtargeting of ads in general stands in sharp contrast to the
broadcasting of ads in mediums like major metropolitan
newspapers, radio and television, through which advertisers
provide content to a broad audience (e.g., to all readers of The
108
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Washington Post). Microtargeting delivers ad content to very
specific subgroups (e.g., readers who shop at Whole Foods who
are between the ages of twenty-five and forty-nine, and who have
watched a certain video on YouTube) or even to specific, listed
individuals (by using tools such as Facebook’s Custom
Audiences).115 This practice is essentially the “online equivalent
of whispering millions of different messages into zillions of
different ears for maximum effect and with minimum
scrutiny.”116 It employs and capitalizes on the social data–––such
as an individual’s likes, dislikes, interests, preferences, behaviors
and viewing and purchasing habits–––collected by social media
platforms about their users and made available to advertisers to
enable advertisers to segment individuals into small groups so as
to more accurately and narrowly target advertising to them.117
Facebook, for example, reportedly tracks a list of over 1,100
attributes for each user, including information regarding users’
demographics, behaviors, and interests.118
The practice of microtargeting enables advertisers to
capitalize on the comprehensive social data about individuals
collected by social media platforms. This social data is then used
to design and disseminate content that advertisers predict will be
the most effective and relevant with respect to the targeted
segment of individuals. For example, an advertiser might limit
the scope of an ad’s distribution to, “single men between 25 and
35 who live in apartments and ‘like’ the Washington
Nationals.”119 While businesses derive certain benefits from the
microtargeting of ads in nonpolitical contexts, microtargeting of
115
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ads in the political context can pose serious problems for the
democratic process and for the marketplace of ideas model that
underlies our First Amendment model of freedom of speech.120
Unlike political advertising on mass media like broadcast
television or radio––in which large national or regional
audiences are exposed to the same political advertisement––by
employing narrowly cast microtargeted ads on social media, a
political advertiser can craft a specific ad to a much narrower
intended audience, and to only that specific audience, thereby
preventing others from accessing and scrutinizing the content of
the ad.
The microtargeting of political ads, compared to the
dissemination of political ads via traditional media outlets, is
problematic for a number of reasons from a free speech
perspective. First, political ads disseminated via traditional
media are subject to a host of federal regulations requiring
transparency, disclosure, limitations on foreign interference, etc.,
as discussed above, whereas ads disseminated via social media
are not.121 Second, political ads disseminated via traditional
media are subject to broad exposure and broad public scrutiny–
–which are necessary for the truth-facilitating features of the
marketplace of ideas mechanisms to function. Microtargeted
ads, on the other hand, are not similarly subject to broad
exposure or broad public scrutiny. Third, and relatedly,
microtargeted ads on social media are more likely to be
susceptible to the spread of misinformation. As politics and
technology expert Dipayan Ghosh explains: “[Microtargeting of
political ads facilitates] ‘organic’ shares and reshares of content
pushed by unpaid users who appreciate what they see . . . and
wish to spread it around their networks. This results in free
content consumption for the political campaign. . . . [and this]
viral spread of ‘unpaid’ or ‘organic’ content . . . further
encourages the success of misinformation campaigns.”122
In short, the microtargeting of political ads disseminated
via social media is especially pernicious because it is not subject
to regulatory scrutiny, not subject to meaningful widespread
120

See generally Nunziato, The Marketplace of Ideas Online, supra note 81, at 1523.
See supra Parts II.C–II.D.
122
Dipayan Ghosh, What is Microtargeting and What Is It Doing in Our Politics?,
MOZILLA: INTERNET CITIZEN (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://blog.mozilla.org/internetcitizen/2018/10/04/microtargeting-dipayanghosh/.
121
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public scrutiny, and because––as discussed above––false claims
in such political ads are likely to be spread farther, faster, deeper,
and more broadly than true claims in political ads.123

F. Measures to Address False Political Advertising and
Microtargeting by Social Media Platforms
As of this writing, despite a heightened awareness of the
problems caused by microtargeted political advertising and by
false political ads, such problems have yet to be effectively
addressed via regulation or legislation (at least in the United
States). Instead, political advertising on social media, and the
regulation of false political speech and microtargeting in
particular, is subject to an ad hoc patchwork of voluntary,
piecemeal measures recently adopted by the social media
platforms themselves. Some of the social media platforms—
notably Twitter—are adopting rigorous measures to combating
such problems, while others—notably Facebook—have adopted
more of a hands-off approach, at least with respect to political
ads that constitute “direct speech by politicians.”124 Below I
examine the measures undertaken by the social media platforms
to address problems caused by the microtargeting of political ads
and by false and misleading political ads.
1. Twitter’s Regulation of Political Ads
Of the three major social media platforms, Twitter has
taken the most aggressive stance with respect to false and
misleading political ads by banning political ads altogether. In
October 2019, Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey announced that the
platform would ban all political advertising.125 The decision
places Twitter in stark contrast with Facebook, which allows
political ads and exempts politicians’ political ads from its factchecking program126 and whose CEO Mark Zuckerberg had
stridently defended his company’s laissez-faire attitude towards
political content moderation on the grounds that this approach

123

See Vosoughi, Roy & Aral, supra note 83, at 1146–1151.
See infra Part II.F.
125
Jack Dorsey (@jack), TWITTER (Oct. 30, 2019, 4:05 PM),
https://twitter.com/jack/status/1189634360472829952.
126
Nick Clegg, Facebook, Elections and Political Speech, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Sept.
24, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/elections-and-political-speech/.
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upholds the ideal of free expression.127 By contrast, Dorsey
distinguished Twitter’s new policy by explaining that it is not
about free expression, but rather about politicians “paying for
reach.”128
Twitter published its policy for implementing its political
advertising ban on November 11, 2019, a little less than a year
before the 2020 presidential election.129 Twitter defines political
content as that which “references a candidate, political party,
elected or appointed government official, election, referendum,
ballot measure, legislation, regulation, directive, or judicial
outcome.”130 Ads that reference the above, including by “appeals
for votes, solicitations of financial support, and advocacy for or
against any of the above-listed types of political content” are
prohibited.131 PACs, SuperPACs, candidates, political parties,
and elected or appointed government officials are also banned
from advertising on Twitter.132 There are, however, some
exemptions. Advertisers that Twitter deems to be news
publishers may reference political content so long as the
reference does not amount to advocacy.133
Twitter’s Legal, Policy and Trust & Safety Lead Vijaya
Gadde also identified an exemption for “cause-based ads”134—
ads that “educate, raise awareness, and/or call for people to take
action in connection with civic engagement, economic growth,
127

Cecilia Kang & Mike Isaac, Defiant Zuckerberg Says Facebook Won’t Police Political
Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/business/zuckerberg-facebook-freespeech.html.
128
Jack Dorsey (@jack), TWITTER (Oct. 30, 2019, 4:05 PM),
https://twitter.com/jack/status/1189634377057067008.
129
Political Content, TWITTER: BUS., https://business.twitter.com/en/help/adspolicies/prohibited-content-policies/political-content.html (last accessed Sept. 3,
2020).
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Political Content FAQs, TWITTER: BUS., https://business.twitter.com/en/help/adspolicies/prohibited-content-policies/political-content/political-content-faqs.html
(last accessed July 19, 2020).
133
Political Content, supra note 129. Such publishers must have a minimum of 100,000
monthly unique visitors in the United States. See How to Get Exempted As a News
Publisher from the Political Content Policy, TWITTER: BUS.,
https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies/ads-content-policies/politicalcontent/news-exemption.html (last accessed July 19, 2020). They must also have a
searchable archive, may not be primarily user-generated or aggregated content, and
must not be dedicated to a single issue. Id.
134
Vijaya Gadde (@vijaya), TWITTER (Nov. 15, 2019, 1:30 PM),
https://twitter.com/vijaya/status/1195408747926917120.
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environmental stewardship, or social equity causes.”135 Political
organizations, candidates, and politicians may not use such ads,
but other groups may.136 Among other restrictions,137 causebased ads may not be microtargeted.138
Twitter’s allowance of cause-based ads is an apparent
response to initial criticism of Twitter’s policy. Many users
reacted to Twitter’s announcement by requesting more precise
definitions, including questions about what constitutes a
“political” ad139 and what constitutes an “ad.”140 As yet, it is
unclear. Twitter states that for-profit organizations may place
“cause ads” if they do not “have the primary goal of driving
political, judicial, legislative, or regulatory outcomes” and are
“tied to the organization’s publicly stated values, principles,
and/or beliefs.”141 However, it is not clear at this time how
Twitter will interpret the “primary goal” language in its policy.142
135

Cause-Based Advertising Policy, TWITTER: BUS.,
https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies/restricted-content-policies/causebased-advertising.html (last accessed July 19, 2020).
136
Gadde (@vijaya), supra note 134.
137
Restrictions include certification for caused-based advertisers. Cause-based
Advertiser Certification, TWITTER: BUS., https://business.twitter.com/en/help/adspolicies/ads-content-policies/cause-based-advertising/cause-based-certification.html
(last accessed July 19, 2020).
138
See Cause-Based Advertising Policy, supra note 135.
139
Aaron Huertas (@aaronhuertas), TWITTER (Oct. 30, 2019, 3:37 PM),
https://web.archive.org/web/20191030232518if_/https://twitter.com/aaronhuerta
s/status/1189672683400761344.
140
Brad Koenig (@MavsLaker), TWITTER (Oct. 31, 2019, 4:19 PM),
https://twitter.com/MavsLaker/status/1190000411559780358.
141
Cause-based advertising FAQs, TWITTER: BUS.,
https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies/ads-content-policies/causebased-advertising/faqs.html (last accessed July 19, 2020).
142
Some have commented that Sierra Club could promote their causes but not single
out politicians or legislation, or that a group could run a gun violence awareness ad
but not call for a ban on assault weapons as that would imply a legislative outcome.
Sheila Dang & Paresh Dave, Twitter Tightens Bans on Political Ads and Causes Ahead of
2020 U.S. Election, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/ustwitter-politics-adban-idUSKBN1XP224. Others have observed the challenges
Twitter can expect to face in distinguishing between causes and political outcomes.
See id. For instance, is an ad about universal healthcare a cause, or is it about a
related bill, and how would that be determined? Still others have observed that, if
Twitter’s misinformation policy is not integrated with its cause-based ads policy,
Twitter could still permit inaccurate, but “softer” talking points that don’t rise to the
level of lobbying, e.g. an anti-minimum wage ad would not be permitted but an
inaccurate ad about how a minimum wage law bankrupted a town could conceivably
be permitted. Emily Stewart, Twitter Is Walking into a Minefield with Its Political Ads
Ban, VOX: RECODE (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/11/15/20966908/twitter-political-ad-banpolicies-issue-ads-jack-dorsey.
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In addition to prohibiting political ads on its platform,
Twitter recently announced measures to combat misinformation
in the form of manipulated media like deepfakes and shallow
fakes.143 On February 4, 2020, Twitter announced its new policy
on “synthetic and manipulated media,” which provides:
“[Twitter users] may not deceptively share synthetic or
manipulated media that are likely to cause harm.” 144 In addition,
“[Twitter] may label Tweets containing synthetic and
manipulated media to help people understand their authenticity
and to provide additional context.”145 Pursuant to this rule,
Twitter will label content that is deceptively altered or fabricated,
and will remove content if it impacts public safety or is likely to
cause serious harm.146 Twitter has already shown, on five
separate occasions, that it will place warnings on posts from the
President that violate its policies, such as its policies on abusive
behavior and on misinformation, including manipulated
media.147
143

See Yoel Roth & Ashita Achuthan, Building Rules in Public: Our Approach to
Synthetic & Manipulated Media, TWITTER BLOG (Feb. 4, 2020),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/new-approach-to-syntheticand-manipulated-media.html. A “deepfake” is a “product of artificial intelligence or
machine learning, including deep learning techniques (e.g., a technical deepfake),
that merges, combines, replaces, and/or superimposes content onto a video, creating
a video that appears authentic.” Community Standards: Manipulated Media,
FACEBOOK, https://m.facebook.com/communitystandards/manipulated_media/
(last accessed Jan. 12, 2021); see generally Danielle K. Citron & Robert Chesney, Deep
Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L.
REV. 1753 (2019); Richard L. Hasen, Deep Fakes, Bots, and Siloed Justices: American
Election Law in a “Post-Truth” World, 64 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 534 (2020).
144
Roth & Achuthan, supra note 143.
145
Synthetic and Manipulated Media Policy, TWITTER HELP CENTER,
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/manipulated-media (last visited July
19, 2020).
146
See id. Notably, “media that meet all three of the criteria defined above—i.e. that
are synthetic or manipulated, shared in a deceptive manner, and likely to cause
harm—may not be shared on Twitter and are subject to removal.” Id. Additionally,
“accounts engaging in repeated or severe violations of this policy may be
permanently suspended.” Id.
147
Twitter’s first warning labels on Tweets from the President involved
unsubstantiated claims about mail-in ballots being fraudulent, glorifying
violence/use of force, and a manipulated video. Elizabeth Dwoskin, Twitter’s decision
to label Trump’s Tweets was two years in the making, WASH. POST (May 29, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/05/29/inside-twitter-trumplabel/. As of the time of this writing, Twitter most recently affixed a warning label to
a second Tweet from the President promoting use of force against protestors, citing
its policy regarding “the presence of a threat of harm against an identifiable group.”
Rachel Lerman, Twitter slaps another warning label on Trump tweet about force, WASH.
POST (June 23, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/23/twitter-slaps-anotherwarning-label-trump-tweet-about-force/. Facebook left the post up without a
warning. Id.
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In the first case of Twitter applying its new policy on
disinformation through deliberately altered content, Twitter
labeled as “manipulated media” an edited video featuring
presidential candidate Joe Biden in which Biden appeared to be
endorsing President Trump for re-election in 2020, which was
tweeted by White House social media director Dan Scavino and
retweeted by the President.148 The video had been edited so as to
mislead viewers into believing that Biden was actually endorsing
Trump.149

Figure Seven: Tweet from Dan Scavino, labeled by Twitter as
“Manipulated Media.”150
In short, Twitter’s absolute ban on political ads and its
restrictions on manipulated media constitute strong and likely
effective measures toward addressing the problems of false and
148

See Ivan Mehta, Trump’s retweet with doctored Biden video earns Twitter’s first
‘manipulated media’ label, THE NEXT WEB (March 9, 2020),
https://thenextweb.com/twitter/2020/03/09/trumps-tweet-with-doctored-bidenvideo-earns-twitters-first-manipulated-media-label/.
149
Id.
150
Dan Scavino (@DanScavino), TWITTER (Mar. 7, 2020, 8:18 PM),
https://twitter.com/DanScavino/status/1236461268594294785.
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misleading political speech. Some skeptics of the ban, however,
have pointed out that the ban will not affect “organic” content or
messages from politicians that are shared or retweeted by
supporters, and that it could encourage the use of “bots” or paid
users to amplify the tweets.151 In addition, it remains to be seen
whether Twitter’s carve-out for caused-based ads will provide
sufficient opportunities for important speech on topics of civic
and social activism.
2a. Facebook’s Regulation of Falsity in Political Ads
Facebook is taking a number of steps to combat
misinformation on its platform.152 The company has adopted
extensive
measures
to
combat
publicly-available
misinformation, including by partnering with independent thirdparty fact checkers to evaluate posts, providing counterspeech in
the form of “Related Articles”/“Additional Reporting on This”
on topics similar to false or misleading posts, and limiting the
distribution of posts from content providers who repeatedly
share false news and eliminating their ability to profit.153 These
measures are applicable to political content and political ads, but
they are not applicable to posts that are considered “direct speech
by a politician.”154 Thus, under Facebook’s currently applicable
fact-checking policies, political speech and the content of
political ads are subject to fact-checking—except if such content
constitutes “direct speech by a politician.”155 This exception for
politicians’ content has come under substantial scrutiny in recent
months, especially given the highly controversial posts of
151

AFP, Twitter Exempts some ‘Cause-based’ Messages from Political Ad Ban, FIN.
EXPRESS (Nov. 16, 2019),
https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/technology/twitter-exempts-somecause-based-messages-from-political-ad-ban/; see also Zack Whittaker, Twitter Says it
Will Restrict Users from Retweeting World Leaders Who Break Its Rules, TECHCRUNCH
(Oct. 15, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/10/15/twitter-world-leaders-breakrules/.
152
See Tessa Lyons, Hard Questions: What’s Facebook’s Strategy for Stopping False News?,
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (May 23, 2018),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/05/hard-questions-false-news [hereinafter
Lyons, Hard Questions].
153
See Hunt Allcott et al., Trends in the Diffusion of Misinformation on Social Media, app.
at 4 (Stan. Inst. for Econ. Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 18-029, 2018),
http://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/fake-news-trends-appx.pdf (listing in
Table 1 all of Facebook’s efforts to combat false news).
154
Fact-Checking on Facebook: Program Policies, FACEBOOK BUS. HELP CTR.,
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/315131736305613?id=673052479947730
(last visited Sept. 4, 2020).
155
Id.
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President Trump.156 Before examining this controversial
exception to Facebook’s general fact-checking policy for public
posts on its platform, I first examine the company’s generallyapplicable policy itself.

2b. Facebook’s General Fact-Checking Policy for PubliclyAvailable Posts—Excluding the Posts of Politicians
Facebook is continuing to expand the partnership that it
began in December 2016 with fact-checkers to evaluate publiclyavailable content posted on its platform.157 Through its factchecking initiatives, Facebook is working with select
independent third-party fact checkers, which are certified
through the non-partisan International Fact-Checking
Network.158 In the United States, the certified fact-checking
organizations with whom Facebook works are the Associated
Press, factcheck.org, Lead Stories, Check Your Fact, Science
Feedback, and PolitiFact.159
Facebook has expanded its fact-checking initiative to
include the fact checking of all public, newsworthy Facebook

156

See Michael M. Grynbaum & Tiffany Hsu, CNN Rejects 2 Trump Campaign Ads,
Citing Inaccuracies, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/business/media/cnn-trump-campaignad.html; see also Cecilia Kang, Facebook’s Hands-Off Approach to Political Speech Gets
Impeachment Test, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/technology/facebook-trump-biden-ad.html.
157
See Lyons, Hard Questions, supra note 152.
158
See id.; see also Verified Signatories of the IFCN Code of Principles, POYNTER,
https://ifcncodeofprinciples.poynter.org/signatories (last visited Sept. 12, 2020).
159
See Mike Ananny, Checking in with the Facebook Fact-Checking Partnership, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/tow_center/facebook-factchecking-partnerships.php; see also How are independent fact-checkers selected on
Facebook?, FACEBOOK HELP CTR., (explaining process of how a third party becomes a
fact-checker for Facebook),
https://www.facebook.com/help/1599660546745980?helpref=faq_content (last
visited Sept. 29, 2018); Fact-Checking on Facebook, FACEBOOK HELP CTR.,
https://www.facebook.com/help/publisher/182222309230722 (last visited July 19,
2020) (providing an overview of Facebook’s fact-checking program). Notably,
Facebook had added The Weekly Standard to these ranks for a period of time in an
attempt to respond to critics who claimed that its fact-checking program was
politically biased, but this publication is now defunct. See Aaron Rupar, Facebook’s
Controversial Fact-checking Partnership with a Daily Caller-funded Website, Explained, VOX
(May 6, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/5/2/18522758/facebook-fact-checkingpartnership-daily-caller.
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posts, including links, articles, photos, and videos.160 The factchecking process on Facebook also applies to political
advertisements unless those advertisements (or other posts)
constitute the speech of politicians.161 As Facebook explains:
We don’t believe . . . that it’s an appropriate role
for us to referee political debates and prevent a
politician’s speech from reaching its audience and
being subject to public debate and scrutiny. That’s
why Facebook exempts politicians from our thirdparty fact-checking program . . . . This means that
we will not send organic content or ads from
politicians to our third-party fact-checking
partners for review . . . . [W]e do not submit speech
by politicians to our independent fact-checkers,
and we generally allow it on the platform even
when it would otherwise breach our normal
content rules.162
This conspicuous exception to Facebook's fact-checking
process has major ramifications for the political process, and has
subjected Facebook to substantial criticism in recent months.
Below, I first examine Facebook's fact-checking process
generally, and then turn to the exception to this process for posts
made by elected officials (including their political
advertisements).
Facebook's fact-checking process can be initiated by
Facebook users who flag a post as being potentially false.163
Subject to the exception for direct speech by politicians, any
public, newsworthy post (including text, photos, and videos) can
be flagged for fact-checking, either by a user, by an outside
160

See Antonia Woodford, Expanding Fact-Checking to Photos and Videos, FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM (Sept. 13, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/09/expandingfact-checking.
161
“If the claim is made directly by a politician on their Page, in an ad or on their
website, it is considered direct speech and ineligible for our third-party fact checking
program[,]” “even if the substance of that claim has been debunked elsewhere.” FactChecking on Facebook: Program Policies, supra note 154.
162
Facebook, Elections, and Political Speech, FACEBOOK,
https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/elections-and-political-speech/ (last visited
Jan. 12, 2021).
163
See How do I Mark a Facebook Post as False News?, FACEBOOK HELP CTR.,
https://www.facebook.com/help/572838089565953?helpref=faq_content (last
visited Sept. 29, 2018).
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journalist, or, as is most commonly the case, by Facebook's
machine learning algorithms.164 For a user to flag a post as
potentially false, a user must click “•••” next to the post he or she
wishes to flag as false, then click “Report post,” then click “False
News.”165
Once a post is flagged by a user as a potential false news
story, it is submitted for evaluation to a third-party independent
fact-checker.166 While the process of evaluating posts in the past
was triggered only by user flagging, Facebook now incorporates
other ways of triggering such evaluation, including by providing
its independent fact-checkers with the authority to proactively
identify posts to review167 as well as by using machine learning
to identify potentially false posts.168 For each piece of content up
for review, a fact checker has the option of providing one of six
different ratings: false, altered, partly false, missing context,
satire, or true.169
Once a third-party fact-checker has determined that a post
is false, Facebook then initiates several steps. First, Facebook
deprioritizes false posts in users’ News Feeds, i.e. the constantly
updating list of stories in the middle of a user’s home page
(including status updates, photos, videos, links, app activity, and
likes), such that future views of each false post will be reduced by
an average of eighty percent.170 Second, Facebook commissions
a fact-checker to write a “Related Article” setting forth truthful
information about the subject of the false post and the reasons
why the fact-checker rated the post as false.171 Such content is
164

See Fact-Checking on Facebook: Program Policies, supra note 154.
See How do I Mark a Facebook Post as False News?, supra note 163.
166
See Lyons, Hard Questions, supra note 152 (“[W]hen people on Facebook submit
feedback about a story being false or comment on an article expressing disbelief,
these are signals that a story should be reviewed.”).
167
See id. (“Independent third-party fact-checkers review the stories, rate their
accuracy, and write an article explaining the facts behind their rating.”).
168
See Dan Zigmond, Machine Learning, Fact-Checkers and the Fight Against False News,
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Apr. 8, 2018), https://about.fb.com/news/2018/04/insidefeed-misinformation-zigmond.
169
Fact-Checking on Facebook: Facebook’s Enforcement of Fact-Checker Ratings, FACEBOOK
BUS. HELP CTR.,
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/341102040382165?id=673052479947730
(last accessed August 28, 2020).
170
Id.; see also Tessa Lyons, Increasing Our Efforts to Fight False News, FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM (June 21, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/06/increasingour-efforts-to-fight-false-news/ [hereinafter Lyons, Increasing Our Efforts].
171
See Tessa Lyons, Replacing Disputed Flags with Related Articles, FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM (Dec. 20, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/12/news-feed165
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then displayed in conjunction with the false post on the same
subject.172 While Facebook formerly flagged false news sites with
a “Disputed” flag, the company changed its approach in
response to research suggesting that such flags may actually
entrench beliefs in the disputed posts.173 Facebook now provides
“Related Articles” in conjunction with false news stories, which
apparently does not result in similar entrenchment.174 In
addition, users who attempt to share the false post will be notified
that the post has been disputed and will be informed of the
availability of a “Related Article,” as will users who earlier
shared the false post,175 as in the example below (setting forth
Facebook and Instagram’s flags).

fyi-updates-in-our-fight-against-misinformation [hereinafter Lyons, Replacing Disputed
Flags].
172
See id.; see also Geoffrey A. Fowler, I fell for Facebook fake news. Here’s why millions of
you did, too., WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/10/18/i-fell-facebook-fakenews-heres-why-millions-you-did-too/ (describing steps undertaken by Facebook to
respond to fake video, including posting “Additional Reporting on This,” with links
to reports from fact-checking organizations); Lyons, Replacing Disputed Flags, supra
note 171; Sara Su, New Test with Related Articles, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Apr. 25,
2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/04/news-feed-fyi-new-test-withrelated-articles.
173
See Lyons, Replacing Disputed Flags, supra note 171.
174
See id. (explaining that “[a]cademic research on correcting misinformation has
shown that putting a strong image, like a red flag, next to an article may actually
entrench deeply held beliefs . . . [but that] Related Articles, by contrast, are simply
designed to give more context, which our research has shown is a more effective way
to help people get to the facts. . . . [W]e’ve found that when we show Related
Articles next to a false news story, it leads to fewer shares than when the Disputed
Flag is shown.”).
175
See id.
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Figure Eight: Examples of false information labels
on Instagram.176
In addition, as Facebook explains: "When fact-checkers
write articles with more information about a story, you'll see a
notice where you can click to see why."177 In addition, Facebook
will now post more prominent fact-checking labels as interstitial
warnings atop photos and videos on Facebook (and Instagram)
that were fact-checked as false.
176

Karissa Bell, Instagram adds 'false information' labels to prevent fake news from going
viral, MASHABLE (Oct. 21, 2019), https://mashable.com/article/instagram-falseinformation-labels/.
177
How is Facebook Addressing False Information through Independent Fact-checkers,
FACEBOOK BUS. HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com/help/1952307158131536
(last visited July 21, 2020).

72

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVI EW

[Vol. 19

Third, content providers—i.e., Facebook pages and
domains—that repeatedly publish and/or share false posts will
have their ability to monetize and advertise reduced and
ultimately disabled by Facebook unless and until they issue
corrections or successfully dispute fact-checkers’ determination
that their posts are false.178 Facebook’s nimble and extensive
efforts to combat publicly available misinformation with labeling
and counterspeech are commendable and should be expanded to
include the direct speech of politicians as well, as I examine
below.

2c. Facebook's Policies Regarding False Political Ads
With respect to false political ads, Facebook's policy is
complex. Although Facebook has implemented extensive
measures with respect to false posts generally (described above),
this false news policy does not apply to “direct speech” by
politicians.179 Accordingly, Facebook’s general false news policy,
composed of the fact-checking process described above, has an
exception for “direct speech” by politicians, such that direct
speech by politicians is not run through Facebook's external fact
checking process.180 Facebook provides the following
justification for this exception to its fact-checking policy:
We rely on third-party fact-checkers to help reduce
the spread of false news and other types of viral
misinformation, like memes or manipulated
photos and videos. We don’t believe, however,
that it’s an appropriate role for us to referee
political debates and prevent a politician’s speech
from reaching its audience and being subject to
public debate and scrutiny . . . . This means that
we will not send organic content or ads from
politicians to our third-party fact-checking
partners for review.181
178

See Satwik Shukla & Tessa Lyons, Blocking Ads from Pages that Repeatedly Share
False News, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Aug. 28, 2017),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/08/blocking-ads-from-pages-that-repeatedlyshare-false-news.
179
Fact-Checking on Facebook: Program Policies, supra note 154.
180
Id.
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Nick Clegg, Facebook, Elections and Political Speech, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Sep.
24, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/elections-and-political-speech/.
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Facebook’s decision not to submit direct speech from
current politicians to fact-checking is apparently grounded in the
belief that such political speech is already subject to sufficient
scrutiny among the polity and the free press and should not be
subject to further scrutiny by Facebook’s fact-checkers.182
Facebook further justifies its policies as follows: “In a
democracy, people should decide what is credible, not tech
companies . . . . That’s why––like other [I]nternet platforms and
broadcasters––we don’t fact check ads from politicians.”183
Facebook also defends its decision by adverting to the
importance of political ads to challengers and local candidates:
“Given the sensitivity around political ads, we have considered
whether we should ban them altogether . . . But political ads are
important for local candidates, up-and-coming challengers, and
advocacy groups that use our platform to reach voters and their
communities.”184
As a result, political speech and political posts and
campaign ads made by politicians themselves operate in a
separate system on Facebook. While ordinary users who publicly
post false content may face consequences, including being
banned from Facebook,185 elected officials are exempt.
Facebook's policies came into sharp focus in October
2019, when President Donald Trump’s reelection campaign
began running an ad that was proven to be false about then
former Vice President Joe Biden on Facebook.186 The Trump
Campaign released a 30-second video ad accusing then former
Vice President Biden of promising Ukraine $1 billion in aid in
exchange for firing a prosecutor who was investigating a

Facebook will not fact check political ads from candidates, but it does evaluate and
fact-check political ads from political advocacy groups or political action committees.
See David Klepper, Facebook Clarifies Zuckerberg Remarks on False Political Ads, AP
NEWS (Oct. 24, 2019), https://apnews.com/64fe06acd28145f5913d6f815bec36a2.
182
Id.
183
Klepper, supra note 181.
184
Id.
185
See Lyons, Hard Questions, supra note 152 (explaining that Facebook takes action
against accounts that share false news, including removing accounts that share false
news that also violates other Facebook Community Standards).
186
Amy Sherman, Donald Trump ad misleads about Joe Biden, Ukraine, and the
prosecutor, POLITIFACT (Oct. 11, 2019),
https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2019/oct/11/donald-trump/trump-admisleads-about-biden-ukraine-and-prosecut/.
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company with ties to Biden’s son, Hunter Biden.187 The Biden
Campaign asked Facebook to take down the ad, but Facebook
refused.188 Facebook’s head of global elections policy Katie
Harbath explained: “Our approach is grounded in Facebook’s
fundamental belief in free expression, respect for the democratic
process, and the belief that, in mature democracies with a free
press, political speech is already arguably the most scrutinized
speech there is.”189 Accordingly, the false Trump Campaign ad
on Biden remained on Facebook, garnering at least 4.6 million
views.190
Former presidential candidate Senator Elizabeth Warren,
who has a history of locking horns with Facebook and with big
tech in general,191 took particular aim at Facebook’s policy
towards political ads by placing an intentionally false ad on the
platform in October 2019.192 Warren’s ad declared that “Mark
Zuckerberg and Facebook just endorsed Donald Trump for re-

187

Grynbaum & Hsu, supra note 156.
Kang, supra note 156.
189
Id.
190
Jeremy B. Merrill, While everyone was looking at Facebook, Trump’s false Biden ad
appeared more often on YouTube, QUARTZ (Nov. 1, 2019),
https://qz.com/1739780/trumps-biden-ad-appeared-more-often-on-youtube-thanon-facebook/.
191
See Elizabeth Warren, (@TeamWarren), Here’s how we can break up Big Tech,
MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 2019), https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-canbreak-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c. After announcing her ambition to break up big tech
companies, Warren took out ads on Facebook that denounced Facebook itself as well
as Amazon and Google for their “vast power over our economy and our
democracy.” Cristiano Lima, Facebook backtracks after removing Warren ads calling for
Facebook breakup, POLITICO (Mar. 11, 2019),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/11/facebook-removes-elizabeth-warrenads-1216757. Facebook initially removed the ads, apparently because they contained
an unauthorized reproduction of Facebook’s logo, but soon after, the company
reversed course and restored them “[i]n the interest of allowing robust debate.” Isaac
Stanley-Becker & Tony Romm, Facebook Deletes, and then Restores, Elizabeth Warren’s
Ads Criticizing the Platform, Drawing her Rebuke, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/03/12/facebook-deletes-thenrestores-elizabeth-warrens-ads-criticizing-platform-drawing-her-rebuke/. Warren
meanwhile warned of the danger of a “social media marketplace” that is “dominated
by a single censor.” Elizabeth Warren (@ewarren), TWITTER (Mar. 11, 2019, 7:59
PM), https://twitter.com/ewarren/status/1105256905058979841; Elizabeth
Warren, Elizabeth’s plan: Break up the big tech companies, FACEBOOK (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://www.facebook.com/ElizabethWarren/videos/396777104233421/.
192
Brian Fung, Elizabeth Warren Targets Facebook’s Ad Policy -- with a Facebook Ad,
CNN (Oct. 12, 2019, 12:11 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/11/politics/elizabeth-warren-facebookad/index.html.
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election.”193 She explained that the ad was a test to see “just how
far” Facebook’s policy went and accused Facebook of becoming
a “disinformation-for-profit machine.”194 Adhering to its policy
of refusing to fact-check direct speech by politicians, Facebook
declined to remove Warren’s intentionally (and provocatively)
false ad, stating “if Senator Warren wants to say things she
knows to be untrue, we believe Facebook should not be in the
position of censoring that speech.”195
In addition, Facebook employees recently rose up in
strong opposition to Facebook’s policy exempting politicians’
(and especially President Trump’s) posts from fact-checking (and
from other of the company’s content policies as well, including
those prohibiting threats of imminent violence).196 The particular
flashpoint most recently at issue involved violent speech, not
misinformation, in the form of Donald Trump’s May 2020 post
following the murder of George Floyd and the ensuing
demonstrations.197 Trump threatened to deploy the military in
Minneapolis to “bring the City under control” and infamously
stated “when the looting starts, the shooting starts.”198

193

Elizabeth Warren (@ewarren), TWITTER (Oct. 12, 2019, 10:01 AM),
https://twitter.com/ewarren/status/1183019897804197888?s=20.
194
Id.
195
Fung, supra note 192.
196
See Megan Rose Dickey & Taylor Hatmaker, Facebook Employees Stage Virtual
Walkout in Protest of Company’s Stance on Trump Posts, TECHCRUNCH (June 1, 2020,
1:01 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/01/facebook-employees-stage-virtualwalkout-in-protest-of-companys-stance-on-trump-posts/; see also Rachel Siegel &
Elizabeth Dwoskin, Facebook Employees Blast Zuckerberg’s Hands-off Response to Trump
Posts as Protests Grip Nation, WASH. POST (June 1, 2020, 8:04 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/01/facebook-zuckerbergdonation-trump/.
197
Dickey & Hatmaker, supra note 196.
198
Id.
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Figure Nine: Tweet from Donald Trump following the murder
of George Floyd in May 2020.199
President Trump made this post across multiple
platforms.200 While Twitter appended a notice to the President’s
post explaining that the post violated the platform’s rules against
glorifying violence and requiring users to click through the notice
to view the tweet (see below),

199

Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 29, 2020, 12:53 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1266231100780744704.
200
See id.

2020]

MISINFORMATION MAYHEM

77

Figure Ten: Twitter’s explanation that Donald Trump’s tweet
following the murder of George Floyd violated the platform’s
rules against glorifying violence.201
Facebook took no action.202 Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg
explained that he was personally appalled by the President’s
tweet, but felt that Facebook’s institutional role was to “enable
as much expression as possible unless it will cause imminent risk
of specific harms or dangers spelled out in [Facebook’s] clear
policies.”203 Zuckerberg explained further that “we read
[Trump’s post] as a warning about state action, and we think
people need to know if the government is planning to deploy
force.”204 Some of Facebook’s employees, however, were
extremely dissatisfied by the company’s response, resulting in
“intense debate” on Facebook’s internal employee messaging
system about the company’s laissez-faire policies regarding
politicians’ posts.205 In response, Zuckerberg hosted an internal
town-hall to explain his and the company’s rationale for

201

Twitter Comms (@TwitterComms), TWITTER (May 29, 2020, 3:17 AM),
https://twitter.com/TwitterComms/status/1266267447838949378.
202
Brian Stelter & Donie O’Sullivan, Trump Tweets Threat That ‘Looting’ Will Lead to
‘Shooting.’ Twitter Put a Warning Label on It, CNN BUSINESS (May 29, 2020, 10:40
AM) (screenshot included), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/29/tech/trump-twitterminneapolis/index.html.
203
Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (May 29, 2020, 4:19 PM),
https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10111961824369871.
204
Id.
205
Siegel & Dwoskin, supra note 196.
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inaction.206 Facebook ultimately retreated from its noninterventionist stance towards Donald Trump and his campaign,
at least with respect to its hate speech content regulation, as it
removed a Trump Campaign page ad because it used a hate
symbol.207 However, many companies felt Facebook still had not
gone far enough and joined a growing advertising boycott to
pressure the platform to take more aggressive action against the
hate speech and misinformation being spread by political figures
such as President Trump.208 Facebook responded by announcing
“that it would remove posts [from political leaders] that incite

206

Elizabeth Dwoskin & Nitasha Tiku, Facebook Employees Said They were ‘Caught in
an Abusive Relationship’ with Trump as Internal Debates Raged, WASH. POST (June 5,
2020, 4:37 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/05/facebook-zuckerbergtrump/.
207
Isaac Stanley-Becker, Facebook Removes Trump Ads with Symbol Once Used by Nazis
to Designate Political Prisoners, WASH. POST (June 18, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/06/18/trump-campaign-runs-adswith-marking-once-used-by-nazis-designate-political-prisoners/. Days later when a
Trump-affiliated campaign page posted an advertisement denouncing “dangerous
MOBS of far-left groups . . . causing absolute mayhem” accompanied by an image of
a downward facing red triangle, Facebook deactivated those ads because the image
was the same symbol used by the Nazis to denote political prisoners in its
concentration camps. Id. Facebook representatives stated that the ad violated a
policy against using a “banned hate group’s symbols” outside of a condemnatory
context or as an object for discussion. Id. Zuckerberg has also since announced that
Facebook will begin labeling “newsworthy content.” Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK
(June 26, 2020, 11:25 AM),
https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10112048980882521. Occasionally, he
explains, “we leave up content that would otherwise violate our policies if the public
interest value outweighs the risk of harm.” Id. Now, Facebook will append a
notification that the content violates Facebook’s policy but remains so that people
can engage with and discuss it. Id. Facebook will also further restrict content that can
be included in paid advertisements. Id. Ads that claim people from “a specific race,
ethnicity, national origin, religious affiliation, caste, sexual orientation, gender
identity or immigration status are a threat to the physical safety, health or survival of
others” are now prohibited when they were not before, and Facebook also intends to
“better protect immigrants, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers from ads
suggesting these groups are inferior or expressing contempt, dismissal or disgust
directed at them.” Id.
208
All the Companies Quitting Facebook, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK NEWSLETTER (July 7,
2020) (“Marketers are expressing unease with how [Facebook] handles
misinformation and hate speech, including its permissive approach to problematic
posts by President Trump.”),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/29/business/dealbook/facebook-boycottads.html. For a list of companies boycotting, see Tiffany Hsu & Gillian Friedman,
CVS, Dunkin’, Lego: The Brands Pulling Ads from Facebook Over Hate Speech, N.Y. TIMES
(July 7. 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/26/business/media/Facebookadvertising-boycott.html; Allen Kim & Brian Fung, Facebook boycott: View the list of
companies pulling ads, CNN (July 2, 2020, 6:05 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/28/business/facebook-ad-boycott-list/index.html.
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violence or attempt to suppress voting . . . [and] affix labels on
posts that violate hate speech prohibitions.”209
Facebook’s policies also drew sharp criticism from civil
rights experts, who conducted an extensive, independent twoyear civil rights audit of Facebook’s content regulation policies
and their implementation.210 The experts’ concerns were
magnified by Facebook’s response to President Trump’s posts
regarding recent civil rights protests and mail-in ballots in the
context of the pandemic.211 The civil rights experts strongly
criticized Facebook’s policies and exemption of Trump’s posts
from its content regulation policies and voiced particular concern
about the ramifications of this exemption for our political
process:
We have grave concerns that the combination of
the company’s decision to exempt politicians from
fact-checking and the precedents set by its recent
decisions on President Trump’s posts, leaves the
door open for the platform to be used by other
politicians to interfere with voting. If politicians
are free to mislead people about official voting
methods (by labeling ballots illegal or making
other misleading statements that go unchecked,
for example) and are allowed to use not-so-subtle
dog whistles with impunity to incite violence
against groups advocating for racial justice, this
does not bode well for the hostile voting
environment that can be facilitated by Facebook
in the United States. We are concerned that
politicians, and any other user for that matter, will
capitalize on the policy gaps made apparent by the
president’s
posts
and
target
particular
209

Craig Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Silicon Valley is getting tougher on Trump and
his supporters over hate speech and disinformation, WASH. POST (July 10, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/07/10/hate-speech-trumptech/. Twitch recently suspended President Trump’s account and Reddit closed a
long-controversial forum named after the President (this same forum helped to
popularize the dangerous Pizzagate false conspiracy theory). Id. Reddit’s action may
have been in response to “employee” concerns as well, as it came after an open letter
written by hundreds of volunteer moderators chastised Reddit’s leadership for the
proliferation of hateful speech, calling it the company’s “most glaring problem.” Id.
210
See MURPHY ET AL., FACEBOOK’S CIVIL RIGHTS AUDIT – FINAL REPORT, supra
note 18.
211
Id. at 37–38.
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communities to suppress the votes of groups based
on their race or other characteristics. With only
months left before a major election, this is deeply
troublesome as misinformation, sowing racial
division and calls for violence near elections can
do great damage to our democracy.212
The concerns of the civil rights experts turned out to be
well-founded. The company’s reticence to take decisive action
regarding the hateful and dangerous rhetoric of politicians has
indeed brought about great damage to our democracy.

2d. Facebook's Transparency and Disclosure Requirements
Regarding Political/Electioneering Advertisements
Facebook recently implemented a Political Advertising
Policy that requires, first, that every election-related and issue
advertisement made available on Facebook to users in the
United States be clearly labeled as a “Political Ad” and include
a “Paid for by” disclosure, with the name of the individual or
organization who paid for the advertisement at the top.213
Second, under the Policy, Facebook has committed to collecting
and maintaining a publicly available archive of political
advertisements as part of its Ad Library, which provides
information about “the campaign budget associated with an
individual ad and how many people saw it––including their age,
location, and gender.”214 See example below.

212

Id. at 10.
See Rob Goldman & Alex Himel, Making Ads and Pages More Transparent,
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Apr. 6, 2018),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04/transparent-ads-and-pages/.
214
Rob Leathern, Shining a Light on Ads with Political Content, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM
(May 24, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/05/ads-with-politicalcontent/. See also MURPHY, supra note 18, at 36 (“Since 2018, Facebook has
maintained a library of ads about social issues, elections or politics that ran on the
platform. These ads are either classified as being about social issues, elections or
politics or the advertisers self-declare that the ads require a ‘Paid for by’
disclaimer.”).
213

2020]

MISINFORMATION MAYHEM

81

Figure Eleven: Example from Facebook’s Ad Library.215
Facebook has also recently updated its Ad Library to
increase transparency and provide more useful data––including
by permitting users to search for and filter ads based on the
estimated audience size––which enables researchers, advocates,
and the public to identify and study micro-targeted ads.216
Finally, under the Policy, Facebook will prohibit foreign entities
from purchasing political ads directed at U.S. audiences.217
Facebook enforces this by mailing prospective political
advertisers a postcard to a U.S. address to verify U.S.
residency.218 If a prospective purchaser of a political ad is not
verified under this process, he or she will not be able to purchase
a political ad on Facebook.219 Commenting on the recently
implemented Political Advertising Policy, Facebook’s CEO
Mark Zuckerberg explained, “These changes won’t fix
everything, but they will make it a lot harder for anyone to do
what the Russians did during the 2016 election and use fake
215

FACEBOOK AD LIBRARY,
https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?active_status=all&ad_type=political_and_
issue_ads&country=US&id=210610646733923&view_all_page_id=10737101405768
0 (click “See Ad Details”) (last accessed Oct. 17, 2020).
216
See MURPHY, supra note 18, at 35–37.
217
Get Authorized to Run Ads About Social Issues, Elections or Politics, FACEBOOK BUS.
HELP CTR.,
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/208949576550051?id=288762101909005
&recommended_by=241608613261133 (last visited Oct. 16, 2020).
218
See id.
219
See id.
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accounts and pages to run ads.”220 Facebook’s recently
implemented measures imposing disclosure requirements on
political ads and limiting foreign entities from purchasing
political ads go beyond those that are encompassed in the
proposed Honest Ads Act, and may at least be moderately
successful in preventing the type of foreign interference in U.S.
elections that occurred in 2016.
The challenges of microtargeting and foreign influence
have further complicated Facebook’s efforts to mitigate the
harms of political misinformation and disinformation by its users
and especially its advertisers, and the revelations surrounding the
election of 2016 serve as a potent reminder of the potential
dangers of failing to do so. Facebook was slow to get started in
taking responsibility for what happens on its platform, but now
the platform seems to be trending in the right direction in
regulating political advertising and other controversial political
speech on its platform, in the absence of actual government
regulation.

3a. Google’s Measures to Address Microtargeting
of Political Ads
Google recently amended its rules governing the practice
of microtargeting of political advertisements.221 While Google
maintains that it has never offered “granular microtargeting” of
election ads, in November 2019, Google officially amended its
rules to restrict microtargeting so that political advertisers can
only target ads based on three characteristics: an individual’s age,
gender, and general location (defined by postal code).222 Political
advertisers can also use contextual targeting, which enables them
to serve users with ads according to the content that users are
accessing.223 Google claims this approach aligns it with industry
practice in television, radio and print media.224 Google’s policy
on microtargeting took effect in the European Union at the end
220

Josh Constine, Facebook and Instagram Launch US Political Ad Labeling and Archive,
TECHCRUNCH (May 24, 2018, 2:01 PM),
https://techcrunch.com/2018/05/24/facebook-political-ad-archive/.
221
See Scott Spencer, An Update on Our Political Ads Policy, GOOGLE BLOG: THE
KEYWORD (Nov. 20, 2019), https://blog.google/technology/ads/update-ourpolitical-ads-policy/.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id.
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of 2019, and became effective worldwide (including in the
United States) in January 2020.225
Accordingly, under Google’s rules, only the following
characteristics may be used to target election ads: geographic
location (but not radius around a location), age, gender, and
contextual targeting options such as ad placements, topics,
keywords against sites, apps, pages and videos.226 All other types
of targeting are not allowed for use in election ads, including the
use of Google’s powerful Audience Targeting products,227
Remarketing,228 Customer Match,229 and Geographic Radius
Targeting.230 Google’s microtargeting policy applies to ads
shown to users of Google’s search engine and YouTube, as well
as display advertisements sold by Google that appear on other
websites.231 In an email to political campaigns, Google outlined
these new rules, explaining that election ads will no longer be
allowed to target what are called “affinity audiences” that look
like other groups that campaigns might want to target.232 Further,
political campaigns can no longer upload their own lists of
people to whom they wish to show ads.233 In addition, Google
will prohibit what is known as “remarketing,” the process of
serving ads to people who have previously taken an action like
visiting a campaign’s website.234

225

See Rachel Sandler, Google Limits Microtargeting for Paid Political Ads, FORBES (Nov.
20, 2019, 8:22 PM),
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https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/6014595 (last accessed July 21,
2020) [hereinafter Election Ads in the United States, Political Content].
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https://support.google.com/google-ads/answer/2497941 (last accessed: July 21,
2020).
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About Remarketing, GOOGLE ADS HELP, https://support.google.com/googleads/answer/2453998 (last accessed: July 21, 2020).
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About Customer Match, GOOGLE ADS HELP, https://support.google.com/googleads/answer/6379332 (last accessed: July 21, 2020).
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2020).
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Google’s microtargeting policy prevents political
advertisers from taking advantage of some of Google’s most
sophisticated targeting tools, upon which it has built its
dominant market position.235 The most granular of those
targeting tools are custom audiences (formerly known as
“custom affinity” audiences), an offering that has allowed
advertisers to create tailor-made audiences by targeting
individual interests and lifestyles as defined by keyword
phrases.236 Google’s sophisticated targeting tools also have
allowed advertisers to target or exclude audiences according to
demographic data such as age, gender, household income,
homeownership, and the like.237 General advertisers may also
target users who have previously interacted with their site238 or
by submitting previously collected customer data to re-engage
with the same group or expand to similar audiences.239 These
sophisticated targeting tools are now unavailable to political
advertisers.240
One of the greatest challenges Google faces in
implementing its policy restricting the use of microtargeting by
political advertisers is how to meaningfully and accurately define
political/election advertising. With respect to the United States,
Google currently defines election ads as those that feature:
1.

235

A current officeholder or candidate for an elected federal
office (including federal offices such as that of the
President or Vice President of the United States, members
of the United States House of Representatives or United
States Senate).

Patience Haggin & Kara Dapena, Google’s Ad Dominance Explained in Three Charts,
WALL STREET J. (June 17, 2019) (“[Google] has a 37% of the $130 billion U.S.
digital ad market, according to research firm eMarketer.”),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-googles-advertising-dominance-is-drawingantitrust-scrutiny-11560763800.
236
About Custom Audiences, GOOGLE ADS HELP, https://support.google.com/googleads/answer/9805516?hl=en&ref_topic=3122880 (last accessed Oct. 16, 2020).
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About Demographic Targeting, GOOGLE ADS HELP,
https://support.google.com/googleads/answer/2580383?hl=en&ref_topic=3122881 (last accessed July 21, 2020).
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Remarketing: Reach People Who Visited Your Site or App, GOOGLE ADS HELP,
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(last accessed July 21, 2020).
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A current officeholder or candidate for a state-level
elected office, such as Governor, Secretary of State, or
member of a state legislature.
A federal or state level political party.
A state-level ballot measure, initiative, or proposition that
has qualified for the ballot in its state.241

Figure Twelve: Google’s top political advertisers in the United States.242
Yet, few election ads as they are popularly understood are
likely to be so specific. For example, “issue ads” funded by
Super-PACs may not specifically “advocate the election or
defeat of a clearly identified federal candidate,”243 yet such
outside spending makes up the vast majority of political

241

Id.
For data on Google’s top political advertisers in the United States since May 31,
2018, see Political Advertising in the United States, GOOGLE TRANSPARENCY REP.
https://transparencyreport.google.com/political-ads/region/US (last visited Feb.
22, 2021).
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advertising.244 Thus, Google’s definition of election ads may
turn out to be substantially underinclusive and ineffective.
Google has also implemented a host of procedural
requirements for political advertisers. Advertisers who wish to
purchase and run election ads245 or use political affiliation in
personalized advertising246 in the United States must go through
a verification process, which is required for all ad
formats/extensions, and all personalized ads features.247 Political
advertisers must provide a Federal Election Commission (FEC)
ID and either an Employer Identification Number (EIN) (for
organizations)
or
Social
Security
Number
(for
248
individuals). Google collects such data and makes available a
transparency report on political ad spending by each
advertiser/campaign.249 The transparency report lists top
advertisers and the amount of political ad spending by each
advertiser.250 A recent transparency report (as of June 6, 2020)
provides this list of top political ad spending since May 31,
2018.251

3b. Google’s Regulation of Falsity and Misleading Content
in Political Ads
Google also recently revised its rules about truth-inadvertising to prohibit ads with “demonstrably false claims that
could significantly undermine participation or trust” in

244
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https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?disp=R (last updated
Sept. 4, 2020).
245
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accessed Oct. 16, 2020).
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Id.; see also Apply for Verification for Election Advertising in the United States, GOOGLE
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Oct. 16, 2020).
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Id.
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elections.252 Google has stated, however, that by reframing these
truth-in-advertising rules, it does not intend to appoint itself as
the arbiter of truth in politics.253 Google explains that since “no
one can sensibly adjudicate every political claim, counterclaim,
and insinuation,” it will focus its efforts on claims that are
something more than generic falsehood or exaggeration.254 It will
not take comprehensive action against every misleading political
ad but will do so for “clear violations.”255 That line will likely be
difficult to define and maintain. In its announcement, Google
gives the example of “deep fakes” as the type of content that it
will now remove.256 These are addressed by Google’s policy
prohibiting “manipulating media to deceive, defraud, or mislead
others.”257 The example the company provides is “deceptively
doctoring media related to politics, social issues, or matters of
public concern.”258 Google has also released an open-source
database containing 3,000 manipulated videos in order to help
identify and target deepfakes.259
It is as yet unclear what falls within the category of
demonstrably false political ads according to Google,260 but a few
examples provide some guidance. When YouTube CEO Susan
Wojcicki was asked whether YouTube would remove President
Trump’s advertisement (which he placed on Facebook) falsely
accusing Joe Biden of corruptly sheltering his son from a
Ukrainian investigation through bribery, Wojcicki explained
that this ad “would not be a violation of our policies” because
252

Spencer, supra note 221; Misrepresentation, GOOGLE ADVERT. POLICIES HELP,
https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/6020955?hl=en (last accessed July
21, 2020).
253
See Spencer, supra note 221.
254
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255
Id.
256
Id.
257
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258
Id.
259
Karen Hao, Google Has Released a Giant Database of Deepfakes to Help Fight Deepfakes,
MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 25, 2019),
https://www.technologyreview.com/f/614426/google-has-released-a-giantdatabase-of-deepfakes-to-help-fight-deepfakes/; see also Nick Dufour & Andrew
Gully, Contributing Data to Deepfake Detection Research, GOOGLE AI BLOG (Sept. 24,
2019), https://ai.googleblog.com/2019/09/contributing-data-to-deepfakedetection.html.
260
Google and YouTube have removed over 300 Trump ads in the last half of 2019,
but the archive in which removed ads are listed does not indicate why specific ads
were removed. Shachar Bar-On & Natalie Jimenez Peel, 300+ Trump Ads Taken
Down by Google, YouTube, CBS NEWS: 60 MINUTES OVERTIME (Dec. 1, 2019),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/300-trump-ads-taken-down-by-google-youtube-60minutes-2019-12-01/.

88

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVI EW

[Vol. 19

“politicians are always accusing their opponents of lying.”261 On
the other hand, Wojcicki cited the (now infamous) video that
showed Nancy Pelosi speaking at an artificially reduced rate,
which made Pelosi appear to be drunk.262 Wojcicki noted that
that video was removed “very fast” because “it’s not okay to
have technically manipulated content that would be
misleading.”263
With respect to manipulated media in particular,
YouTube has adopted specifically applicable policies.264 Its
deceptive practices policies state that “[c]ontent that has been
technically manipulated or doctored in a way that misleads users
(beyond clips taken out of context) and may pose a serious risk
of egregious harm” are prohibited and will be removed from
YouTube.265 YouTube has further stated that it will remove
content that attempts to mislead people about the voting process
or any other false information relating to elections.266 YouTube
also recently created an Intelligence Desk to help review
technically-manipulated content and take proactive approaches
to mitigate the spread of such content,267 and the company has
also changed its recommendations systems to prevent people
from viewing misinformation on its site.268
In the absence of formal regulation, the platforms have
been left to decide for themselves where and how to draw the line
between protected free speech and unprotected harmful
misinformation on their platforms––and they have reached
different conclusions on where that lines falls.
Where Twitter characterizes political ads as “paying for
reach”269 and does not allow them on its platform and further
does not allow even non-political, cause-based ads to be
261
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264
How YouTube Supports Elections, YOUTUBE OFFICIAL BLOG (Feb. 3, 2020),
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microtargeted, Facebook exempts politicians from fact-checking
entirely and permits microtargeting for political ads, while
allowing for the flagging and fact-checking of potential political
misinformation made available by non-politicians on its
platform. Facebook contends that this is the proper line to draw
because political speech is subject to sufficient scrutiny among
the polity and the free press,270 notwithstanding the fact that
microtargeting of ads allows politicians to avoid this broad
scrutiny. In response to studies about entrenchment of false
beliefs, Facebook changed its terminology on false content alerts
from “disputed” to “additional reporting on this,” which
suggests some measure of responsiveness on Facebook’s part to
data about the negative impacts of the platform’s policies.
Google, for its part, permits ad targeting, but only based
on a limited set of characteristics, as discussed above, and does
not permit some of its most powerful tools to be used for
promoting political ads. Google’s policies apply to YouTube and
its display ad network, not merely to the eponymous search
engine itself. In addition, Google prohibits ads that undermine
trust in elections, as well as deepfakes or other doctored media
related to “politics, social issues, or matters of public concern,”271
which it distinguishes from mere spoken falsehoods.272 Rather
than demonetizing content that attempts to mislead people about
elections or the voting process, YouTube removes the content
outright.273

III. ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF PLATFORMS’ MEASURES
TO COMBAT MEDICAL AND POLITICAL MISINFORMATION
The efforts undertaken by the major social media
platforms’ measures to address medical and political
misinformation are not without their problems. These efforts,
however, are generally consistent with First Amendment
substantive and procedural values, are trending in the right
direction, and are by and large welcomed by the American
public.
The platforms’ efforts are not subject to First

270
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Amendment scrutiny, since the platforms are not state actors.274
On the contrary, the platforms enjoy great discretion with respect
to the choices they make regarding content regulation on their
platforms, thanks to Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act (at least for now).275 That said, the measures that
the platforms have undertaken to combat misinformation have
been largely consistent with First Amendment substantive and
procedural values.
First, the platforms’ most interventionist efforts with
respect to false medical misinformation and false/misleading
statements of fact in the health and medical context are
consistent with First Amendment substantive values, in which
lesser protection is accorded for false and misleading statements
of fact (especially in the medical field).276 While the marketplace
274
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275
47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2018). The Communications Decency Act Section 230
prohibits any attempt to hold social media platforms liable for hosting harmful
speech or for taking steps to remove harmful speech. Id. Section 230(c)(1) of the Act
provides that “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.” Id. Courts have consistently interpreted this provision to
immunize social media platforms from liability for hosting a variety of categories of
harmful speech, including causes of action such as defamation, negligence, gross
negligence, nuisance, sending threatening messages, and even statutory violations of
the Fair Housing Act and related anti-discrimination violations. See generally Danielle
Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans
§ 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (2017). In addition, the “good Samaritan”
provision of Section 230 immunizes platforms from liability for undertaking
measures to screen or block content on their platforms, providing that platforms
cannot “be held liable on account of . . . any action voluntarily taken in good faith to
restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene . . . excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable . . . .” 47
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constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the
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of ideas theory (and its default response of counter-speech as a
remedy for bad speech) accords broad protection to good and
bad ideas, it does not accord the same broad protections to good
and bad claims or assertions of fact.277 The Supreme Court, in
embracing the marketplace of ideas theory, has made clear that
there is no such thing as a false idea—that all ideas are protected—
but that false statements of fact are not similarly immune from
regulation.278 While the Court has sometimes recognized the
minimal potential contributions to the marketplace of ideas
made by harmless lies,279 or some false statements of fact,280 it has
also emphasized that the First Amendment does not stand in the
way of regulating intentionally false or misleading assertions of
fact,281 especially in the medical context. Indeed, in the context
of false and misleading statements of fact regarding medical
treatments, cures, medicine, etc., the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) have extensive authority, consistent with the First
Amendment, to prohibit false and misleading claims. The FDA
and the FTC are empowered to prohibit the false or misleading
branding, advertising, marketing, and/or sale of products—
including products that claim to be cures or treatments for
COVID-19—and these agencies have recently cracked down on

preventing, treating, or alleviating the common cold); see generally Nunziato, The
Marketplace of Ideas Online, supra note 81.
277
Nunziato, The Marketplace of Ideas Online, supra note 81, at 1526.
278
See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340; Nunziato, The Marketplace of Ideas Online, supra note
81, at 1526.
279
See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 732 (2012) (Breyer, J. concurring). In
United States v. Alvarez, the Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, struck down a portion
of the Stolen Valor Act, a federal law that criminalized the making of false
statements about having a military medal. Id. at 724 (plurality opinion). The Act
made it a misdemeanor to falsely represent oneself as having received any U.S.
military decoration or medal and provided for prison terms up to six months (and up
to one year if the subject of such lies was the Medal of Honor). Id. at 715. In a
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online purveyors of such products.282 Thus, it is not inconsistent
with First Amendment values for the social media platforms to
undertake measures to combat false and misleading statements
of fact, especially in the area of medical and health related
information.
In addition, the platforms’ efforts to remove content likely
to incite violence or great public harm is consistent with the
emergency exception in First Amendment jurisprudence, as
originally articulated by Holmes and Brandeis283 and as
recognized by the Court in its incitement jurisprudence in
Brandenburg v. Ohio284 and its progeny. Content that is created or
shared with the purpose of immediately contributing to or
exacerbating violence or physical harm is generally subject to
regulation under the First Amendment’s incitement
jurisprudence, under which the government is permitted to
regulate “advocacy of . . . law violation . . . where such advocacy
282

See Alexandra Sternlicht, The FTC Has Sent Cease-And-Desist Letters to Over 150
Companies Who Claim to Have COVID-19 Cures, FORBES (July 9, 2020),
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States and deliver misbranded drugs were brought against fake Florida church that
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are safe and effective for the treatment or prevention of COVID-19 and that the
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502 of the Food Drug & Cosmetic Act (the “FD&C Act”). 21 U.S.C. § 352. In
addition, under the Federal Trade Commission Act (the “FTC Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 41
et seq., “it is unlawful . . . to advertise that a product can prevent, treat, or cure
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evidence, including, when appropriate, well-controlled human clinical studies,
substantiating that the claims are true at the time they are made.” Asahi Shimbun, 20
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TRADE COMM’N BUS. BLOG (Aug. 14, 2020, 11:41 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/business-blog/2020/08/20-more-warning-letters-tell-companies-cutout-unproven. Accordingly, to make or exaggerate such claims without scientific
evidence sufficient to substantiate them violates the FTC Act. Id.
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is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action.”285
Further, the platforms’ efforts to label less harmful false
and misleading medical information, and to develop and refer
users to accurate information, revolves primarily around
providing counterspeech instead of implementing censorship as a
remedy. This is consistent with First Amendment substantive
values and with the marketplace of ideas theory of the First
Amendment, according to which––ever since the formative years
of modern First Amendment jurisprudence––the accepted
response to bad speech is not censorship but more (better)
speech.286 As Justice Brandeis explained in his oft-quoted
concurrence in Whitney v. California,287 joined by Justice Holmes:
“If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies [of speech], to avert the evil by the process of education,
the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”288
According to the marketplace theory of the First
Amendment, ideas should generally be allowed to compete
freely in the marketplace unfettered by government restrictions
(absent emergency conditions).289 The default remedy for
harmful ideas in the marketplace of speech is not censorship, but
counterspeech, which operates by allowing those who are
exposed to bad speech to be exposed to good speech as a
counterweight.290 The platforms’ efforts to respond to false and
misleading medical and political information by labeling them as
such, and to refer users to accurate information, is consistent
with this counterspeech approach in First Amendment
jurisprudence. In addition, the platforms’ efforts in regulating
misinformation in political speech and political advertising
contribute toward “producing an informed public capable of
conducting its own affairs” and facilitating the preconditions
necessary for citizens to engage in the task of democratic selfgovernment,291 which are also foundational goals of our First
Amendment jurisprudence.
285
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The platforms’ efforts are also generally consistent with
First Amendment procedural values and with principles of due
process generally.292 The First Amendment’s protections for
freedom of expression not only embody a substantive dimension
of which categories of speech to protect; they also embody
procedural dimensions, imported from the Due Process Clause,
which require that “sensitive tools” be implemented by
decisionmakers in restricting speech.293 As free speech theorist
Henry Monaghan explains, “procedural guarantees play an
equally large role in protecting freedom of speech; indeed, they
assume an importance fully as great as the validity of the
substantive rule of law to be applied.”294
Accordingly,
First
Amendment
jurisprudence
incorporates a powerful “body of procedural law which defines
the manner in which [decisionmakers] must evaluate and resolve
[free speech] claims —[establishing] a First Amendment due
process.”295 This jurisprudence embodies “a comprehensive
system of procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers
of a censorship system.”296 Consistent with these procedural
safeguards embodied in First Amendment jurisprudence, social
media platforms should impose speech restrictions on medical
and political misinformation in a clear, neutral, and transparent
manner such that speakers are adequately and clearly informed
of the platforms’ rules regarding speech, speakers are specifically
informed of the reasons why their speech was restricted
(removed or labeled), decisions are made consistently by
impartial decisionmakers, and speakers have an opportunity to
be heard to appeal any such speech restrictions. In general, the
platforms have provided clear notice to users of their (evolving)
terms of service regarding medical and political misinformation
and have provided users with clear notice when implementing
speech removal or labeling decisions. For example, as discussed
above, when Twitter restricted Donald Trump, Jr.’s posts
embodying false claims about unproven cures for COVID-19 on
292

See generally, Dawn Carla Nunziato, How (Not) To Censor: Procedural First
Amendment Values and Internet Censorship Worldwide, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1123 (2014);
Dawn Carla Nunziato, Forget About It? Harmonizing European and American Protections
for Privacy, Free Speech, and Due Process, in PRIVACY AND POWER (Cambridge
University Press, 2017).
293
Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963).
294
Henry Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process”, 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 518 (1970)
(internal quotations omitted).
295
Id.
296
Id. (internal quotations omitted).

2020]

MISINFORMATION MAYHEM

95

the grounds that the post violated Twitter’s rules regarding
medical misinformation,297 it did so in the context of providing
clear prior notice of what speech was restricted and a process to
appeal Twitter’s decisions,298 and it also provided notice to
Trump, Jr., of the specific reason why his speech was restricted.
See below.

Figure Thirteen: Twitter’s notice to Donald Trump Jr. after
restricting Trump Jr.’s account features.299
In short, the extensive measures undertaken by the major
social media platforms to respond to false and misleading
misinformation in the medical and political contexts are
generally consistent with our First Amendment substantive and
procedural values.
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In addition, recent studies have shown that the efforts
undertaken by the major social media platforms’ measures to
address political and medical misinformation have been
moderately successful. As Hunt Allcott and his co-authors report
in their article Trends in the Diffusion of Misinformation on Social
Media, based on their study of “trends in the diffusion of content
from 570 fake news websites and 10,240 fake news stories on
Facebook and Twitter between January 2015 and July 2018,”
while “[u]ser interactions with false content rose steadily on . . .
Facebook . . . through the end of 2016,” since then, “interactions
with false content have fallen sharply.”300 The authors of the
study find that “user interaction with known false news sites has
declined by 50[%] since the 2016 election.”301 Based on these
findings, the authors conclude that “efforts by Facebook
following the 2016 election to limit the diffusion of
misinformation [namely, the ‘suite of policy and algorithmic
changes made by Facebook following the [2016] election’302]
may have had a meaningful impact.”303
Further, the labeling of content as false or misleading on
social media platforms has been shown to be effective in limiting
the dissemination of false or misleading content. According to a
recent study, social media users were about 50% less likely to
share false stories if the stories had been labeled as false.304 When
no labels were used at all, participants considered sharing 29.8%
of false stories in the sample, but that figure dropped to 16.1% of
false stories that had a label attached.305 In addition, the labeling
of posts as false led to improved accuracy in social media users’
beliefs. Researchers found, in an exhaustive series of surveys
across more than 10,000 participants on a wide range of topics,
that 60% of respondents gave accurate answers when presented
with a fact-check/correction, while only 32% expressed accurate

300
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Finally, there is broad public support among Americans
for social media platforms’ continuing to take a meaningful role
in combating political and medical misinformation on their
platforms. A March 2020 Knight Foundation/Gallup Poll found
that the vast majority of Americans surveyed (81%) supported
the removal of intentionally misleading information on elections
or other political issues, and an even greater majority of
Americans surveyed (85%) supported social media companies’
removal of intentionally misleading health information.307

Figure Fourteen: March 2020 data from a Knight
Foundation/Gallup Poll measuring public opinions about
harmful content online.308
306
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Porter and Thomas J. Wood, found that the most effective fact-checks shared four
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the issue rather than merely calling the misinformation “wrong,” they didn’t directly
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CONCLUSION
Social media platforms are playing an ever-expanding
role in shaping the contours of the information ecosystem today,
as these platforms have shouldered the burden of ensuring that
the public is informed––and not misinformed––about matters
affecting our democratic institutions in the context of our
elections, as well as about matters affecting our very health and
lives, in the context of the pandemic. The platforms are
attempting to address these serious problems alone, in the
absence of federal or state regulation or guidance in the United
States. While the platforms’ intervention in the online
marketplace of ideas is not without its problems, this Article has
argued that this intervention is by and large a salutary
development and is one that has brought about improvements in
the online information ecosystem. Social media companies have
been generally inspired by First Amendment free speech values–
–both substantive and procedural––to protect a vibrant
marketplace of ideas online while imposing limited, moderately
effective checks on harmful false and misleading speech, with
complex systems of removal, fact-checking, and labeling, and by
serving up prominent information from independent factcheckers and trusted authorities to counter medical and political
misinformation. In the absence of effective regulatory measures
in the United States to combat medical and political
misinformation online, social media companies should be
commended for their efforts thus far and should continue to
develop and deploy even more successful measures to combat
such misinformation online.

